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ABSTRACT
UNITED STATES TACTICAL DOCTRINE,
1855 TO 1861:
THE MISMEASURE OF TECHNOLOGY
MARION V. ARMSTRONG, JR.
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
DIRECTOR: DR. HAROLD S. WILSON
This thesis illuminates the state of United States Army tactical 
doctrine at the beginning of the Civil War. In 1855, the weapons 
available to the United States Army left much to be desired in terms of 
firepower. Their limited range and lack of accuracy meant that they 
could not be relied upon to render the final decision in battle. The 
tactical system of 1855, however, blended this firepower with the shock 
action effect of bayonets and sabres, permitting the capabilities of the 
weaponry to be maximized on the battlefield while at the same time 
minimizing the deficiencies.
This harmony between weapons and tactics was not to be long lived. 
In June 1855, the United States Army adopted the rifled musket which 
greatly increased the firepower capability of the infantry. However, 
the effect that this new firepower would have on the conduct of battle 
was not understood. Military manuals and literature published between 
1855 and 1861 failed to adequately prepare the officer corps of 1861 for 
the carnage this weapon would produce on the battlefields of 1861 to 
1865.
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CHAPTER 1 
TACTICS, 1855
On 10 April 1835, Lewis Cass, Secretary of War under President 
Andrew Jackson for the majority of that stalwart's time in office, 
endorsed for publication a manual of tactics written to standardize the 
manner in which American infantry were to drill and fight. Cass's words 
of endorsement were both strong and delimiting: "With a view to ensure 
uniformity throughout the Army, all infantry exercises and manoeuvers 
not embraced in this system are prohibited, and those herein prescribed 
will, . . .  be strictly observed."1
The author of this manual was Brigadier General Winfield Scott. 
Scott had been one of America's top soldiers since the War of 1812 when 
he trained and led a brigade on the Canadian frontier and contributed 
significantly to the all too few American victories in that theater. 
Throughout his career following the War of 1812, Scott maintained a 
keen, scholarly interest in the art and science of managing armies and 
controlling men in battle. By 1834 he twice toured Europe, meeting with 
every noted military personage that he could, while keeping detailed 
notebooks of what he learned from them as well as from his own
Winfield Scott, Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the Exercise and 
Manoeuvres of the United States' Infantry, 3 vols. (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1859), 1:5.
1
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2observations. He avidly collected every manual and work on military 
service amassing a large collection.
In 1815 and 1824, and again in 1826, Scott was appointed to head 
boards of tactics assembled to review and revise the tactical manuals 
used by the United States Army and by the state militias. In 1834, 
largely on his own initiative, he undertook to translate the latest 
French manual of infantry tactics and to adapt it for the use of United 
States infantry. His objective was to establish a tactical system for 
the infantry which would be uniform throughout the Army and the militia. 
The result of Scott's effort was titled Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for 
the Exercise and Manoeuvres of United States' Infantry. It was 
proclaimed by Secretary Cass as the official tactical manual for 
infantry, and remained so without significant revision until 1862.
At the beginning of his manual, Scott offered his readers a 
definition of tactics taken from Spirit of the System of Modern War 
first published in 1799 by the noted European military theorist Friherr 
Heinrich Dietrich von Billow. "Tactics," BClow had written, "I call, 
the science of movements which are made in the presence of the enemy, 
that is, within his view, and within reach of his artillery." In 
selecting this definition, Scott established that his tactical system, 
for the most part, was concerned with the movement of troops in battle. 
More specifically, the true essence of Scott's and every other mid­
nineteenth century system of infantry tactics lay in the capability it 
gave to unit commanders to control the conduct of their body of troops 
on the battlefield. The state of the military art at that time, the 
methods of movement and communication in particular, meant that control 
could only be exercised through a system of personal supervision,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3wherein the commander could be both seen and heard by those who were to 
receive his orders. So it was that Scott's Tactics was in reality, and 
of necessity, a system of close order drill by which a commander issued 
verbally, specific and definite orders to his troops which they in turn 
were to carry out with precision and uniformity of movement.2
Scott's Infantry Tactics was printed in three small volumes, each 
measuring only four-by-six inches, to make them convenient for officers 
to carry in the field. The first volume was divided into three sections 
called titles. Title One consisted of general instructions which 
included describing the infantry regiment— the basic combat unit— as 
consisting of ten companies, eight battalion companies, a grenadier 
company, and a light infantry or rifle company, depending on how this 
latter company was armed. It also specified the positions of all 
officers and noncommissioned officers when the regiment formed in line 
of battle. Though not specified or discussed in the manual, the 
strength of an infantry company in 1834 was approximately 100 men, 
officers and noncommissioned officers included. A regiment, then, could 
number up to 1000 men, if it were recruited and maintained at full 
strength. Captains commanded the companies, while the regiment was 
commanded by a colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a 
small staff that included an adjutant and a quartermaster officer.
In Title Two, "The School of the Soldier," Scott designated the 
stance and movements of each soldier in a formation and the manner in 
which the soldier would handle his weapon. This particular set of
2r .r. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic 
to National War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 114; Scott, unnumbered 
page at the beginning of vol. 1.
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4procedures and the section that contained them would be known as the 
manual of arms. Because in formation the soldiers would be elbow to 
elbow with the ranks only 13 inches apart, the author admonished 
instructors of his drill to continually take great care to rectify the 
position of each soldier so that he would never occupy too much space in 
his rank.3
Also in "The School of the Soldier" were the procedures for 
loading and firing the soldier's musket. The manual divided the loading 
process into 12 steps. For the new recruit these were to be carried out 
at the order of separate commands with the same precision and measured 
cadence expected in other movements. As the soldier became more 
experienced, the number of commands was reduced to four with each 
soldier performing the intervening steps at an individual but rapid 
pace. When the soldier mastered loading the musket, the manual allowed 
for accomplishing the procedure with but one command. In this final 
phase of instruction which mimicked the desired behavior of battle, 
Scott stipulated that the soldier should "load with the greatest 
possible promptitude, each without regulating himself by his neighbor, 
and above all without waiting for him."4
Firing the musket was hardly less simple and no less carefully 
controlled than its loading. On command, the soldier readied the weapon 
by bringing it from the left shoulder to hold it diagonally across the 
front of his body as he pulled back the hammer with the right thumb to 
the full cock position. In taking aim— the next command— the soldier
^Scott, 1:39.
4Ibid., 1:65.
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5was to "shut the left eye, direct the right along the barrel, drop the 
head upon the butt to catch the object, and place the fore-finger on the 
trigger.”5 Officers controlled the direction of fire by specifying the 
aim to be directly to the front or at an angle to the right or left. On 
the command to fire, the soldier pulled the trigger and immediately 
brought the weapon to the ready position in preparation for executing 
the next command.
Lastly in "The School of the Soldier," the basic rules for 
marching were laid down. The length of the step was to be exactly 28 
inches. For training, the pace would be "common time,” a rate of 90 
steps per minute. Experienced soldiers would march at "quick time," 110 
steps per minute. The direction of march could be changed in three 
ways. A march to the oblique caused the soldiers to step off at a 45 
degree angle to the right or left while still facing forward. Marching 
"by the flank" required the soldiers to face to the right or left and 
move off in the new direction. Wheeling caused a rank of soldiers to 
change direction by pivoting on the soldier on the right or left end of 
the rank.
The final title of Volume I provided the methods for controlling 
the company. In the six subdivisions of "The School of the Company," 
called "lessons," the company commander was told how to conduct the 
manual of arms, control the loading and firing sequence in his unit, 
maneuver the company in line of battle, move it— still in line of 
battle— by either flank, form and march the company in column, and 
change the configuration of the column in order to pass obstacles. Once
5Ibid., 1:64.
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6an officer mastered this complex drill, he would be able to smoothly 
adjust the position of his company to meet any battlefield situation 
provided, of course, that his soldiers were well practiced and could 
respond to the commands with the proper movement and required precision.
In Volume II of the tactics, Scott addressed control of the 
battalion, the next larger tactical unit above the company. In 1834, 
the battalion was not an organization of standard size, but any grouping 
of two or more companies exercised or maneuvered as a unit. A full 
regiment of ten companies controlled as a unit by the regimental 
commander was called a battalion as were two, three, or more companies 
detached from the regiment but exercised under the command of one 
officer. Thus, Volume II of the tactics, titled, in part, "The School 
of the Battalion," provided direction for any officer responsible for 
two or more companies operating in the field together. "The School of 
the Battalion" followed approximately the form of "The School of the 
Company." In five parts it told commanders of battalions how to conduct 
the manual of arms and control battalion firings, pass from line of 
battle into column, march in column, pass from column into line of 
battle, and maneuver in line of battle. Like "The School of the 
Company," "The School of the Battalion" provided a complete system of 
control. An officer who was the master of this drill would have little 
trouble moving his battalion in the field.
As a supplement to "The School of the Battalion," Scott included 
in Volume II "Instruction for Light Infantry and Rifle, or Skirmishers." 
Although he had specified previously that each regiment would have one 
company of light infantry or rifles, he did not limit the drill in this 
section to that company alone. "By the general term skirmishers, will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
herein be understood any company or body of infantry, whether 
denominated grenadiers, light infantry, rifle, or battalion companies, 
thrown out and actually deployed into open files or loose order." The 
purpose of having skirmishers was "to clear the way for, and to cover 
the movements of the main corps." Because skirmishers operated in 
extended order, the standard company and battalion drill would not 
suffice for their control. Controlling a body of skirmishers required a 
drill that considered intervals between files governed by the extent of 
the ground to be covered, provided for using terrain as cover when 
possible, and allowed the two soldiers in each file to arrange the 
timing of their fire so that one of them would always be loaded. Scott 
felt that it was necessary that skirmishers always be backed up by a 
reserve force, so instructions for selecting, positioning, and 
controlling a reserve, as well as a system for reforming skirmishers in 
line of battle, was included.®
In the final volume, Scott turned his attention to control of the 
largest infantry units on the mid-nineteenth century field of battle: 
the brigade, the division, and the corps d’ armee. The brigade was to 
be composed of two battalions, the division of two brigades, and the 
corps d' armee of two divisions. Titled "Evolutions of the Line," 
Volume III paralleled in organization and content "The School of the 
Battalion." Scott reasoned that control of several battalions was not 
essentially different from the control of one, and that since the 
principles of control were already set down in "The School of the 
Battalion," it remained only "to apply those principles to a line of
®Ibid., 2:187-88.
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8many battalions."7 The system of control at the brigade and division 
level as envisioned by Scott was as follows:
When the general shall wish to cause a movement to be 
executed, he will give the general commands relative thereto.
Each colonel [commander of a battalion] will always 
successively repeat, with the greatest rapidity, . . . those 
general commands, unless the general has given, or sent to him, 
an order to the contrary.
The colonels having repeated the general commands, . . . 
will immediately command, and cause to be executed, without 
waiting for each other, the preparatory movements which, in 
their battalions, ought to precede the execution of the general 
movement.
The brigadier and major generals will look to the prompt 
execution of these preparatory movements in their brigades and 
divisions, and rectify any error that may be committed by the 
colonels.
The final command, or that which determines the execution of 
the general movement, will always be given by the general.®
With Volume III, the principle of tactical control through close 
order drill was extended to every infantry unit. In theory, to control 
his army on the battlefield, a general simply had to know the proper 
commands as did a captain to control a company or a colonel to control a 
battalion. The drill was a system of tactics, because the drill 
facilitated, as Bulow had specified, the execution of movements in the 
presence of the enemy.
While Scott's manual was a landmark in the history of American 
military development, it was an adaptive and innovative work rather than 
one of originality and invention. It was based on a recent French 
tactical manual that incorporated the latest in tactical thought and 
which was adapted by Scott to the particular organization of United
7Ibid., 3:8.
8Ibid., 3:9-10.
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9States infantry. It provided a system of tactics that Scott felt was 
the best, considering the needs of the men who would use it. ^ Like all 
infantry tactical systems of the mid-nineteenth Century, Scott's system 
was one of close order drill because drill was the only method through 
which infantry units could be employed effectively on the battlefield.
Two particulars of nineteenth century warfare account for this 
singular characteristic. The first was the ability of commanders to 
communicate orders to their subordinates on the battlefield, especially 
at the regimental and company levels. In an age when wire and radio 
communications did not exist, all control of units had to be exercised 
through verbal commands that could be heard by the officers and soldiers 
who would carry them out. Although regimental and company commanders 
had officers, drummers, and buglers to assist them in relaying orders to 
their subordinates, the area over which commanders at these levels 
exercised effective tactical control was limited to the area they could 
observe and over which they could be heard. Necessarily, all of the 
soldiers in these units had to be formed up and capable of operating 
effectively within this limited area. Such a feat could only be 
accomplished with a tactical system that allowed for the close 
concentration and operation of large numbers of soldiers and the 
communication of orders and directions to those soldiers which would be 
clearly and instantly understood. In consequence, extending and 
maintaining control over a regiment or company meant having the
^Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D (New York: 
Sheldon & Company, 1864), 258-59.
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organization and discipline that only a uniform system of tactical close 
order drill could provide.^
The second particular was the need to develop and apply the combat 
power of the infantry. Effective application of combat power meant 
effective use of the weapons carried by the soldiers. When Scott was 
writing his infantry tactics in 1834, the weapons of the infantry were 
the bayonet and the smoothbore flintlock musket. The bayonet was the 
more traditional weapon, a direct descendant of the pikes that main line 
infantrymen carried in the days when firearms were little more than a 
novelty.11 It was a weapon of shock action. In order to use it, the 
soldier had to be brought into physical contact with the enemy. 
Necessarily, the bayonet would be least effective if the soldiers fought 
individually, with commanders trusting that the individual soldier's 
skill, fitness, and fortitude was at that point superior to that of the 
enemy's soldiers. Battle, in such a case, would be reduced to a mere 
gladitorial contest of the best champions put up by each side. 
However, if an entire unit with bayonets leveled and dressed could be 
brought in close formation against an enemy force, then the bayonet was 
a weapon of great power and terror, effective against even well trained 
opposing troops.
The musket was the soldiers' firearm, but, because of the state of 
firearms technology at that time, it too was little more than a shock 
action weapon requiring close proximity to the opposing force in order
■^Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, 
Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Handling 
Them in Presence of an Enemy (New York: John Wiley, 1862), 33-34.
11Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science (New 
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846), 257, 261.
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to be used with effect. The characteristics of the musket that 
recommended its use by the infantry were two: it could be loaded and 
fired rapidly— up to three rounds a minute— and it could be fired again 
and again without extensive cleaning. To load the musket, the soldier 
took from his cartridge box a cartridge, which was a paper tube, sealed 
at both ends, containing the powder charge and the projectile that the 
musket would fire, a lead ball. The soldier tore open one end of the 
paper cartridge with his teeth and used a small portion of the gun 
powder from it to prime the lock of the musket. The remaining powder 
was dumped down the barrel of the musket followed by insertion of the 
ball into the barrel. The ball was then rammed down the barrel to the 
breech through the use of a ramrod which the soldier drew from a channel 
in the stock of the musket under the barrel. After replacing the 
ramrod, all that remained was for the soldier to draw the hammer to the 
full cocked position, aim, and fire. This capability to load the musket 
rapidly, and to be able to continue doing so even after repeated 
firings, resulted from the fact that the musket ball was considerably 
smaller in diameter than the bore of the barrel. Therefore, it was 
easily pushed into the barrel and seated at the breech through the use 
of the ramrod, even after the barrel became fouled from repeated 
firings. Because of fouling buildup in the barrel after firing, a tight 
fitting projectile could not have been loaded even after just one shot 
without stopping to clean the barrel.
But, even though the musket, because of its capability to produce 
a rapid and sustained fire, was the best firearm of the day for the 
infantry, it had two major disadvantages which greatly limited its 
effectiveness in battle: the musket had a very limited range and was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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highly inaccurate. Just as with the weapon's positive capabilities, the 
undersized projectile was responsible for the deficiencies. In firing 
the musket, what actually propelled the ball down the barrel was a rush 
of hot gas produced by the burning of the gun powder. Because the ball 
did not tightly fit the barrel, much of this gas would escape around the 
ball and proceed it down the barrel without having a propelling effect 
upon the ball. This limited the speed that the ball achieved while 
traveling down the barrel— muzzle velocity— and thus the distance it was 
capable of traveling once it left the barrel. Another problem with the 
undersized ball was that it would bounce from side to side and top to 
bottom as it moved down the barrel. So, like a billiard ball rebounding 
from the rail, the projectile's direction on leaving the barrel was 
determined by which face of the barrel it glanced off last. This made 
the musket so inaccurate that, on the average, a soldier armed with this 
weapon could not repeatedly hit a target the size of a man at a distance 
of only 100 yards. Because of its inherent inaccuracy, the musket had 
no need of a rear sight and only a single blade front sight was provided 
for the soldier to use in aiming.
Tactical systems based on close order drill facilitated the use of 
both the bayonet and the musket because their effective and efficient 
employment required concentrating the largest number of soldiers into 
the smallest linear distance. In using the bayonet closely packed ranks 
could apply the awful power of a disciplined, controlled phalanx of 
leveled and dressed bayonets against the enemy line at the point of 
decision. Correspondingly, the ability to control and to concentrate 
the fire of the soldiers' muskets would enhance that weapon's 
effectiveness. Because of the musket's lack of accuracy, individual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fire by dispersed soldiers would have only limited effect. But, if the 
soldiers were compressed as much as possible in their ranks, and release 
of their fire was controlled and directed toward targets designated by 
the officers, the effect of the fire would be exponentially increased. 
And not only would effectiveness be increased, but the range to which 
that effectiveness could be projected would be increased also. Soldiers 
firing together could be effective against enemy formations at up to 200 
yards, whereas soldiers firing individually were usually not effective 
beyond 100 yards. For soldiers to load, fire, and otherwise handle 
their weapons in tightly packed ranks, and to move those ranks to and on 
the battlefield with speed and agility, dictated a need for uniform and 
precision movements on the part of each individual; in other words, 
soldiers well practiced in a system of tactical close order drill.
The particular requirements for communicating and for using the 
bayonet and the musket effectively determined other important 
characteristics of infantry tactical systems of the 1850s. Chief among 
these were the basic formations to be used by the infantry unit. In 
Scott's Infantry Tactics, as in all other infantry tactical systems of 
that time, there were two basic formations: the line of battle and the 
column. The line of battle consisted of either two or three ranks only 
13 inches apart with an equal number of soldiers in each, all facing in 
the same direction. The most basic subdivision of the line of battle 
was the file, a cross section of the line made up of one soldier from 
each rank. The major advantage of the line of battle was that in this 
formation all of the soldiers could fire their muskets or use their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bayonets to the front. The flanks, though, were a problem as only a 
very limited number of soldiers could use their weapons to cover the 
area perpendicular to the right or left of the line. Scott took this 
into account when he specified that when formed in line of battle there 
would be no break between companies, and battalions would be separated 
by only 22 paces.^
In the line of battle no special controls were required for the 
soldiers to use their bayonets. The musket and bayonet combination was 
of sufficient length that even the men in the rear ranks could present 
their bayonets to the front of the formation through the right side of 
their file. Controlling the fire of the line of battle required 
specification. For the company, Scott stipulated two methods of firing: 
fire by company, and fire by file. In the fire by company, all of the 
soldiers, regardless of the rank they stood in, were to fire together on 
command. In the military lexicon of the day, this was known as volley 
fire. Once the soldiers had fired, they remained in the firing position 
until the next order was given. 13
In fire by file, or fire by two ranks as it was also called, the 
firing commenced on command on the right of the line with the front two 
men of each file firing together. Once they had fired, the front two 
men of the next file to the left would fire, and so it would continue 
down the line. The effect was to create a running fire along the entire 
length of the company line of battle. Unlike the fire by company, in 
the fire by file the soldiers were not required to await orders to
l^scott, Infantry Tactics, 1:7.
13Ibid., 1:117.
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reload. Once each had fired he was to "reload and fire without 
regulating himself by others."14 This insured a continuous fire from 
the company because by the time the last file fired, the men in the 
first file would be loaded and in the process of firing again. To 
maintain this tempo and distribution of fire, the men in the third rank, 
if there were such, did not fire. Rather they waited until the middle 
rank fired and then passed their loaded muskets forward for the middle 
rank men to fire, accepting the fired muskets of the middle rank men to 
be reloaded.
At the battalion level the commander had additional options in 
controlling the fire of his unit, if only because of the number of sub­
units into which the battalion could be divided. He could conduct a 
battalion volley, wherein all the companies and all the soldiers in 
those companies fired together, or he could volley fire by wing, a wing 
being the right or left half of the battalion. He could direct the 
battalion to fire by company, in which case the company commanders 
conducted volley fire in their companies, but alternated their volleys 
with the other company in their division— each two companies, as counted 
from the right, forming a division. Lastly, he could direct the 
battalion to fire by file, and that procedure would be carried out in 
each of the companies individually.
The commander of a line of battle composed of many battalions 
controlled the fire of that line by directing the battalion commanders 
concerning the method of their fire. If the firing was to be by 
battalion volley, the odd battalions (as counted from the right of the
14Ibid., 1:118.
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line) would fire first, the even battalions withholding their fire until 
the soldiers in the odd battalion to the right were almost reloaded. 
However, an order to fire by wing, by company, or by file was to be 
executed by the battalions individually without regard for the progress 
or sequence of fire in any other battalion.
The line of battle was not necessarily a static formation. It 
could be maneuvered either directly or obliquely to the front or the 
rear, and there were a number of methods for executing a "change of 
front." Changing front meant turning the entire line, or a portion of 
it, some degree and distance to the right or left of its original 
position. If only a company were involved, changing front was most 
often a simple procedure of wheeling, but the process increased very 
much in difficulty and complexity at the battalion and higher levels.
The second basic formation, the column, was used to move a unit 
from one place to another as rapidly and efficiently as possible while 
maintaining the maximum level of control and order within the unit. The 
basic characteristic of the column formation was its depth of many ranks 
of soldiers. Its disadvantages were two: its dimensions usually made it 
an excellent target for artillery; and, while in column, few soldiers 
could use their weapons to good effect.
Unlike the line of battle, the column formation had many 
variations. At the company level the simplest column was formed by 
having the soldiers, while in line, face "by the flank" to the right or 
the left. This resulted in a column with a front of either two or three 
soldiers depending on whether the original line of battle had been of 
two or three ranks. The standard column of maneuver for the company, 
though, was the column by platoon, platoons being formed by dividing the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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company in half at the center. The methods of forming a column by 
platoon consisted of forming the company in line of battle and then 
having the platoons "wheel" to the right or left, or having the right 
platoon move forward with the left platoon marching obliquely into 
position behind it. Scott cautioned strongly that in this formation the 
rear platoon was always to maintain a distance from the front platoon 
equal to the length of the platoon front so that the line of battle 
could be instantly reformed to the right or left through the process of 
wheeling. For a march "in route," the company commander could reduce 
the front of this column by forming a column by section— half platoons—  
using the same methods as had been used to form the column by platoon. 
Never though was the front of a column by section to be fewer than seven 
men as this would cause an unacceptable lengthening of the column.
Going from the column by platoon or the column by section back to 
the line of battle required special consideration and procedures. In 
each, the primary consideration was that the new line of battle should 
be exactly the same as the original one with each officer, 
noncommissioned officer, and soldier in the same position as he had been 
originally. The manual contained enough of these procedures that the 
company could reform its line of battle quickly to the front, right, or 
left of the column.
For the battalion, the standard columns of maneuver were the 
column by company and the column by division. The basic methods of 
forming these columns were the same as for forming the column by platoon 
at the company level. However, due to the number of companies involved, 
the procedures were much more complex and more numerous. One of the key 
differences was that at the battalion level the columns could be either
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open or closed in mass. An open column was one in which the distance 
between the companies or divisions was sufficient to allow them to wheel 
to the right or left to reform the line of battle. In a column closed 
in mass, the distance between the companies or divisions was reduced to 
only three paces. Reforming the line of battle at the battalion level 
from either an open or closed column involved very complex procedures. 
Suffice it to say, however, that Scott carefully worked out these 
procedures to permit the line of battle to be reformed quickly and 
precisely in any direction from any c o l u m n . 15
In units of several battalions, the standard columns for maneuver 
remained the battalion columns. Building on the School of the 
Battalion, Scott's instructions for a column of many battalions involved 
moving them into position relative to a base battalion selected by the 
overall commander. Only in this way could a column of several 
battalions be formed. All of the battalions in this formation would be 
in column by company or division, and would maintain a normal distance 
from each other. The preferred formation when the maneuver required the 
battalions to be closed in mass was the column by division.*6
The procedures for going from column to line of battle, changing 
front while in line of battle, and going back to column were the heart 
of every infantry tactical system of the 1850s, Scott's included. The 
more quickly and efficiently these movements could be accomplished, the 
more maneuverability and agility the units would have on the
15Ibid., 2:19, 28-29.
l^This is evident by the fact that the instructions in Volume III 
for maneuvering either a column or line of battalions in mass specifies 
that the battalion be in a column of divisions.
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battlefield. Maneuverability and agility, in turn, gave commanders the 
ability to develop a maximum of combat power at the right time and at 
the right place, whether it was shock action through the use of the 
bayonet, or firepower through the use of the musket. Either way, the 
precise and skillful execution of the movements— the drill— as specified 
in the infantry tactical manual meant a greater chance of survival and 
success in battle.17
Infantry, of course, was not the only combat arm of the armies of 
the 1850s. Two other branches of the service directly participated in 
the conduct of battle, the cavalry and the field artillery. To the 
officers of that day, the most important branch after the infantry was 
the cavalry. In European armies, cavalry was classified as either heavy 
or light according to its particular armament and corresponding 
battlefield mission. Counted as heavy cavalry were carabiniers and 
cuirassiers, so called for the defensive armor that they wore. Light 
cavalry included hussars and chasseurs. Lancers were a type of cavalry 
which could be considered either heavy or light depending on the 
particular mission they were to perform. In the United States the 
distinction between heavy and light cavalry was not preserved as 
markedly as it was in Europe. In fact, the United States Army did not 
even have mounted units between 1815 and 1832. In 1833, Congress began 
returning regular mounted units to the Army, styling them as dragoons.
17Halleck, 125.
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Intended strictly for service on the frontier, these units were 
decidedly light cavalry to the European way of thinking.1®
As with the infantry, the basic unit of the cavalry was the 
regiment. While the cavalry regiment was approximately the same size as 
the infantry regiment, its internal structure was very much different. 
The cavalry regiment was composed of five squadrons, each of which 
consisted of two companies, sometimes called troops. Each company could 
be further subdivided into two platoons. Lieutenants lead the platoons, 
captains commanded the companies, the senior captains the squadrons in 
addition to their own companies, and a colonel the regiment. The 
regimental staff included a lieutenant colonel, three majors, 
lieutenants as adjutant, quartermaster, and commissary officer, and a 
surgeon and assistant sturgeon.1®
For armament, each cavalry trooper carried a heavy saber, two 
pistols, and a carbine. The saber was the traditional weapon of the 
cavalry. It was the shock action weapon of the cavalry in much the same 
way that the bayonet was the shock action weapon of the infantry, except 
that a greater level of individual skill was required to engage in 
combat with the saber than with the bayonet. The firearms of the 
cavalry were like the infantry musket in that they were single shot, 
loaded through the muzzle with a paper cartridge, were smoothbored and, 
thus, were extremely limited in range and accuracy. These
^Mahan, 38, 42-43; Halleck, 264; Randy Steffen, The Horse 
Soldier, 1776-1943, Vol. I, The Revolution, the War of 1812, the Early 
Frontier, 1776-1850 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1977), 84, 88; Richard Wormser, The Yellow Legs, The Story of the United 
States Cavalry (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), 41- 
45; Maurice Matloff, American Military History (Washington: Office of 
the Chief of Miliatry History, United States Army, 1973), 157.
19Steffen, 126, 177; Halleck, 127.
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characteristics were further complicated by the fact that the cavalry 
trooper was often required to load his firearms while mounted, which was 
no easy task. To help in the loading process, the ramrods of the 
weapons were usually attached to the barrel by a chain or swivel, but, 
even so, the loading process while mounted took much more time, greatly 
reducing the firepower capability of the cavalry. The pistols were the 
second most important weapon in mounted close combat, but being single 
shot, limited in range, and impossible to reload during mounted combat, 
they were considered only as an adjunct to the saber. The carbine, the 
effective range of which was less than the musket because of its shorter 
barrel, was used primarily for mounted and dismounted skirmishing. The 
trooper's horse could also be considered a weapon of shock action, for, 
if the circumstances were right, the trooper could ride down his enemy.
During the conduct of a campaign, the role of the cavalry, 
particularly the light cavalry, was to screen and protect the movements 
of the army, front, flank, and rear, and to conduct reconnaissance of 
the enemy. The cavalry was literally the eyes and ears of the 
commander. In this capacity, the cavalry relied on its speed and 
mobility, and on its limited firepower when skirmishing with enemy 
forces. In battle, however, although the individual trooper carried 
three firearms, the value of the cavalry lay entirely in the shock 
action it was capable of producing through a massed, mounted charge with 
the saber or lance as the principal weapon. As with the infantry in 
battle, the cavalry was required to act in mass to be effective, because 
the cavalry trooper had little more capability for individual action 
with his weapons than the individual infantryman had with his. Like the 
infantry, cavalry on the battlefield was maneuvered and would charge in
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either a close order line or column formation. The cavalry formation in 
line was of two ranks while the columns were generally formed by platoon 
or by squadron. Control of cavalry on the battlefield, the ability to 
maneuver and to apply its shock action combat power, was essentially the 
same as with the infantry, a matter of drill. Like Scott’s Infantry 
Tactics, the basic tactical manual of the cavalry, the Cavalry Tactics 
of 1841 by a board of officers, was a translation and adaptation of the 
system of tactics used by the F r e n c h . 20 This manual was in three 
volumes: Volume 1, School of the Trooper, of the Platoon, and of the 
Squadron, Dismounted; Volume 2, School of the Trooper, of the Platoon, 
and of the Squadron, Mounted; and Volume 3, Evolutions of a Regiment.
Field artillery, like cavalry, was divided into classes of heavy 
and light. The distinction was contingent on the size of the guns as 
described by their weight and caliber, and the weight of their 
projectiles. Generally, light artillery included the guns that fired 
projectiles with a weight of six pounds and the heavy artillery the guns 
that fired 12 pound projectiles. However, by the mid-1850s, due to 
improvements that made the gun itself lighter and gun carriages and 
limbers lighter and more efficient, the real distinction in the 
classification of artillery as either heavy or light was in the mobility 
of the guns. Those guns that could be manuvered on the battlefield with 
great speed and agility were counted as light artillery, while those 
guns less mobile in character were considered to be heavy artillery.21
2 0 s t e f f e n ,  177.
2lMahan, 45.
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The basic field piece of the artillery was operated by a crew of 
seven soldiers. It was loaded through the muzzle in much the same way 
as the infantryman's musket was loaded, with the powder charge and 
projectile being rammed to the breech. Also like the musket, the field 
piece was a direct fire weapon, aimed by the gunner through the use of a 
front sight permanently afixed to the muzzle of the gun, and a 
detachable rear sight which was set in place by the gunner for aiming 
and removed before the gun was fired. The gun was fired through the use 
of a friction primer that was set in a vent at the breech of the gun 
leading to the main powder charge. The gun had no recoil mechanism so 
it had to be repositioned and reaimed after each firing. A well drilled 
gun crew working rapidly was capable, when the situation required, of 
loading and firing up to four rounds per minute. The normal sustained 
rate of fire, though, was two rounds per minute.
Following the convention of the other two arms of the service, the 
artillery was formed into regiments of ten batteries each. In reality 
regiments of artillery were rarely, if ever, seen on the battlefield or 
in garrison because the basic combat unit of the artillery was the 
battery. A battery was commanded by a captain and had six guns and the 
men and equipment necessary to operate and support those guns in the 
field, including a limber and caisson team for each g u n . 22 Generally, 
individual batteries were assigned in direct support of infantry and 
cavalry brigades and divisions. The organization of several batteries 
into an artillery battalion was a common practice, if the field army was 
large enough to include several divisions of infantry or cavalry. In
22war Department, A Board of Officers, Instruction for Field 
Artillery, Horse and Foot (Baltimore: Joseph Robinson, 1845), 73-74.
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that case, the artillery battalion would be in addition to the batteries 
directly supporting the brigades and divisions, and would be under the 
control of the field commander.
Unlike the infantry and cavalry, the combat power of the artillery 
lay entirely in its firepower. The standard field pieces used by the 
armies of the 1850s were smoothbored and fired three basic types of 
ammunition. Solid shot, which was the most accurate round, could be 
effective to a maximum range of a little over 1600 yards. It was used 
to batter down fortifications and against masses of troops. Shell and 
spherical case shot, which were exploding rounds, were less accurate 
than solid shot and effective to a range of only about 1500 yards. 
These rounds were to be used against troop formations. The exploding 
charge in them, however, was very small, so their effect was often more 
moral than physical. Another problem with shell and spherical case shot 
was fusing. These rounds were exploded through the use of a time fuse 
which had to be cut by the gunners based on the expected time of flight 
of the projectile to the target. The fuse was ignited by the action of 
firing the gun, and, if everything worked as it was supposed to, the 
round would explode as it reached the target. If the target were large 
enough and stationary, this system could work fairly well, but if the 
target were small, particularly in its lateral dimension, or it was 
moving, getting the round to explode at exactly the right time was more 
than a little difficult. The most effective artillery ammunition, in 
terms of its capability to produce casualties, was the canister round. 
Canister was nothing more than a tin can filled with shot a little 
larger than a musket ball. When the gun was fired the tin container 
disintegrated, spreading the shot as if it came from a giant shotgun.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
The effective range of canister, however, was limited to just 350 
yards. 23
As with the infantry and cavalry, drill was also the instrument of 
control for the artillery. The Instruction for Field Artillery Horse 
and Foot of 1845 described three basic formations for a battery: the 
order in line, the order in battery, and the order in column. The order 
in line placed all six guns side by side while still limbered, either 
followed or preceded by their caissons. From this formation, the 
battery was prepared to move forward, to the right or left, or into 
battery. In battery, the guns were also side by side, only in this case 
they were unlimbered and prepared to fire. From the order in battery, 
the guns could be moved forward or in retreat by half battery, three 
guns moving and three guns remaining in position to cover the movement 
by their fire. As in the infantry line of battle, there were also a 
number of procedures for changing the front of the battery to the right 
or left. The basic column formation had two guns side by side followed 
by their respective caissons, which were in turn followed by the 
remaining four guns and their caissons in the same o r d e r . 24
In the interest of being complete, there was one other type of 
soldier on the battlefield of the 1850s whose primary mission involved 
combat; this was the rifleman. Although Scott accepted the rifle 
company as a substitute for the regimental light infantry company, there 
were many officers who felt that riflemen did not form a proper part of 
the infantry, and that they were no more than marginally useful on the
23jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962), 66-67, 79.
24Instruction for Field Artillery, 133-34.
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battlefield.25 The primary distinction between infantrymen and riflemen 
was that riflemen were armed with a rifled firearm rather than a musket. 
As will be seen, the firing characteristics of the rifle, as opposed to 
those of the musket, made for significant differences in how riflemen 
were employed on the battlefield.
There were three major differences between the rifle and the 
musket. First, the rifle had greater range and was far and away more 
accurate than the musket. With it, even an average marksman was capable 
of hitting an individual at 300 yards, and an expert could be effective 
at ranges of up to 500 yards. The second difference was that to 
properly load the rifle required from one to two minutes. With the 
rifle, the powder had to be precisely measured, the ball had to be 
patched so that it would engage the rifling in the bore of the barrel, 
and then it had to be carefully rammed to seat it properly in the barrel 
at the breach. All of this was time consuming, but absolutely necessary 
to ensure the weapon's greater range and accuracy. Lastly, the rifle 
did not always have the staying power of the musket. As fouling built 
up with each firing, the tightly patched ball became harder and harder 
to ram down the barrel. Not only did this increase loading time, but 
after as few as 25 rounds, the rifleman might have to retire from the 
field to perform a major cleaning of his weapon to be able to reload it. 
These last two differences were major disadvantages on the battlefield 
of the 1850s that made the musket the weapon of choice for the infantry.
Another problem was that the rifleman did not fit conveniently 
into the scheme of battlefield control. In an age of warfare when
2 5 s c o t t ,  Infantry Tactics, 1:7; Mahan, 42; Halleck, 260.
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soldiers were effective only as a part of the mass, the rifleman was an 
individual who had to be exempted in activity in order to be effective. 
A rifle could not be fired instantly on the order of command as could a 
musket, if maximum results were to be achieved. A marksman needed a 
free hand to position himself, acquire his target, take careful aim, and 
squeeze off his shot only when the target was properly aligned in his 
sights. The principles of control through drill, therefore, did not 
adapt themselves well for control of a body of riflemen. Other than the 
instruction that Scott included in his manual for light infantry and 
riflemen on skirmish duty, there was no manual directed at the control 
of riflemen in battle.26
In summary, the rifleman was a soldier who fought through the use 
of fire. But while his fire was long and accurate, in the 1850s it was 
yet deficient in volume, protraction, and compliance to the established 
control measures of the day.
26Halleck, 260; Mahan, 42.
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CHAPTER 2
GRAND TACTICS, 1855
While Scott's Infantry Tactics and other tactical manuals laid out 
the procedures for controlling infantry, cavalry, and artillery in 
battle, it was left to other scholars and writers on the subject of 
military art and science to provide instruction as to how wars should be 
conducted and battles fought.
In the decades after the Napoleonic Wars, the European nations 
enjoyed a cornucopia of writings concerning the theory and practice of 
the conduct of war and large scale military operations. The wars of the 
French Revolution and those of Napoleon had significantly changed the 
established concepts of strategy and tactics, and now military scholars 
and professional soldiers sought to identify and set down the new 
principles and rules for the successful combination of infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery in the conduct of campaigns and battles. 
Although every European nation had its eminent military theorist, the 
majority of these works were written in French or German with only a few 
being translated into English and published in the United States.
Among those published in America, however, was Summary of the Art 
of War by Antoine-Henri Jomini. First appearing in Europe in 1838, it 
was the last of more than twenty-five books, essays, and articles on 
military history and operational theory written by Jomini, and by the 
mid-1850s was probably the most influential volume in Europe, and the
28
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United States as well, on the subject of strategy and the conduct of 
battles. The Swiss born Jomini was a keen observer of military 
operations and interrupter of European military history. He had served 
as an officer on the staff of Napoleon's General Ney from 1805, and 
later, on the staff of the Emperor himself. In 1813, Jomini split with 
Napoleon and joined the Russian army in which he served until his death 
in 1869, ultimately reaching the rank of general. Jomini's first work 
on military theory was published in 1803 when he was only twenty-four, 
but it established him as an authority on military operations, a 
reputation which continued to flourish as Jomini continued to write. 
His Summary of the Art of War, which recapped his theories on military 
art and science, was first translated and published in the United States 
in 1854.
Although not to the extent of the Europeans, a few Americans were 
also thinking and writing on the subject of war and military operations, 
drawing their ideas largely from the Europeans and applying them to 
uniquely American circumstances. Foremost among these American 
theorists were Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Wager Halleck. These two men 
studied carefully the writings of the Europeans, especially the French 
and Germans, and included their ideas in works on military art, science, 
and engineering that were directed not only at American military 
professionals but at the larger body of militia in particular.1
1T. Harry Williams, The History of American Wars from 1745 to 1918 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 195-97. Halleck addressed his work, 
Elements of Military Art and Science, to "volunteers and militia" as a 
part of its title. Mahan frequently did the same, and often addressed 
his introduction "To the Officers of Militia" or mentioned the 
applicability of the work to the militia in his preface.
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Dennis Hart Mahan graduated first in the United States Military 
Academy Class of 1824. His performance while at the Academy was such 
that immediately after graduation he was made assistant professor of 
mathematics and engineering. In 1826, he was sent to Europe by the Army 
to study and report on public works and military institutions. He 
remained in Europe for four years, some time of which was spent as a 
student at the French School of Application for Engineers and Artillery, 
reputed to be one of the finest of its kind in the world. Its faculty 
included many officers who had served under Napoleon. Returning to the 
United States, he resumed teaching at the Military Academy where he was 
appointed a full professor of civil and military engineering in 1832. 
He continued at the Academy in this capacity until his death in 1871. 
Mahan was a prolific writer and frequent contributor to periodicals on a 
variety of subjects. He was best known, however, as the author of 
numerous text books on military engineering and science.
Henry Wager Halleck was a student of Mahan, who graduated third in 
the West Point Class of 1839. He taught there as assistant professor of 
chemistry and engineering even while still a student and for some time 
after graduation. In 1844, he was sent on a tour of Europe receiving 
permission to visit and study French fortifications. On returning, his 
"Report on the Means of National Defense" was published by Congress and 
formed the basis for a series of twelve lectures given at Lowell 
Institute of Boston, as well as for his most notable military work, 
Elements of Military Art and Science, first published in 1846. Assigned 
to California during the war with Mexico, he translated Jomini's Vie 
Politique et Militaire de Napoleon during the seven month voyage around 
South America. Halleck left the Army in 1854 to pursue a career in law
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and business in California, but returned as a Major General in 1861 to 
put his considerable organizational talents to work as commander of the 
Department of Missouri. He was appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies 
by President Lincoln in 1862, but was relegated to the position of Chief 
of Staff when Grant became General-in-Chief in 1864. Unfortunately, 
Halleck is most often remembered for his failings as a wartime leader, 
rather than for his scholarly contributions to the fields of law and 
military science.
In the 1850s, the prevailing military theories on the conduct of 
war and large scale military operations centered on opposing armies 
engaging in decisive battle: "the actual conflicts of armies contending 
about great questions of national policy and of strategy," as Jomini 
defined it. The military experience of the Europeans throughout the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries led them to 
believe that it was the large scale set piece battle fought between the 
principal armies of the contending nations that would finally decide the 
outcome in war. Napoleon himself had written, "It is upon the field of 
battle that the fate of fortresses and empires is decided." The 
importance of battle then, as the center focus of all military 
operations, was paramount. Furthermore, it was requisite that the 
battle be conducted at the right time, in the right place, and under the 
right conditions. Accordingly, the definition of strategy which Halleck 
adopted largely from Jomini underscored the importance of decisive 
battle in that the strategic movements of armies must be directed almost 
entirely toward that end. "Strategy," Halleck wrote, "is defined to be
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the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the hostile movements 
of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon."2
Once achieved, battle was to be conducted according to an 
exhaustive set of principles, rules, and procedures collectively known 
as grand tactics. As defined by Jomini, grand tactics was "the art of 
posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the 
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the 
ground." Mahan's definition was similar in that he specifically related 
grand tactics to the skill and knowledge required by a commander to 
fight a battle, defining grand tactics simply as "the art of combining, 
disposing, and handling troops on the field of battle." Because grand 
tactics was concerned with the overall conduct of battle, specifically 
the employment of all arms— infantry, cavalry, and artillery— together, 
it did not deal with the internal control of individual units as tactics 
and tactical manuals like Scott's did. Both Mahan and Halleck made a 
clear distinction between grand tactics and what they called minor or 
elementary tactics. To them, elementary tactics referred to the drill 
and other instruction of a body of troops which enabled their officers 
to control them in battle. Grand tactics, on the other hand, was 
concerned with the larger concept of control of the battlefield, the 
totality of events during the battle. It was the process of selecting
^Antoine-Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, trans. G.H. 
Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1863), 
178; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977), 78; Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of Military 
Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, 
Tactics of Batles, etc. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846), 37.
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the field of battle, of combining and positioning the available forces, 
and of determining how a battle would be fought.3
The system of grand tactics in use during the 1850s was one that 
sought to combine the basic elements of combat power— shock action and 
fire— in particular and unique ways to attack or defend a battlefield 
position. The bedrock of the system of grand tactics was the infantry. 
The infantry was the most numerous arm of the armies of the 1850s 
because it was clearly the most powerful. It could be easily maneuvered 
over most types of terrain and its bayonet and musket could be used in 
unique combinations of shock action and fire to produce a tremendous 
amount of combat power. The cavalry was next in importance, its combat 
power during battle resulting almost entirely from the shock produced by 
the momentum of its great charging formations. The artillery 
contributed additional firepower to the battle. The heavy batteries 
could be massed and positioned to make the best use of their long range 
fires, while the light and mobile batteries were capable of moving in 
support of the maneuver of the infantry and cavalry.4
Grand tactics recognized three types of battle: the offensive, the 
defensive, and the unexpected. For the most part, the military 
theorists of the 1850s saw the offensive and defensive battles as being 
mutually inclusive; that is, in a single battle one side almost always 
electing to fight on the offensive while the other side would choose to 
fight on the defensive. Halleck counseled that it was the "strategic
^Jomini, 69-70; Mahan, 32; Halleck, 114.
4Jomini, 290, 304, 315; Dennis Hart Mahan, Lithographic Notes on 
the Composition of Armies and Strategy (West Point: n.p., n.d.), 1; 
Mahan, Out-post, 38-40; Halleck, 121, 125, 128-29.
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relationships of the contending forces in a campaign" which "determined 
whether we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and attack him 
wherever he may be found."5 The common essence of the offensive and 
defensive types of battle lay in the fact that one army would take up a 
defensive position in which it could receive the attack of the opposing 
army. The concept of position was of the utmost importance because, as 
will be seen, it was the focus of the system of grand tactics. The 
principles and precepts that made up the body of grand tactics were 
concerned, for the most part, with the establishment of a defensive 
position and the conduct of an offensive or a defensive battle waged 
around that position.
If there was a choice, the preferred mode of fighting the decisive 
battle was on the offensive. Jomini's fundamental principle of war, 
which involved the continual throwing of the mass of one's force upon 
the decisive points in the theater of war or on the battlefield, implied 
the compellingness of the offensive. It was only on the offensive that 
any decisive results could be achieved. Indeed, Jomini pointed out to 
his readers that if his fundamental principle of war was correct, "it 
will be necessary to take the initiative." Jomini went on to mention 
several times the principal advantage of the offensive as being "that 
the assailant has a moral advantage over the assailed, and almost always 
acts more understandingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a 
state of uncertainty." Halleck agreed, writing that, "As a general rule 
the attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive." Both, 
however, readily admitted that the advantage of fighting the battle on
^Halleck, 114-16; Jomini, 179, 186; Mahan, Composition of Armies,
10.
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the offensive was slight at best, and could frequently be "more than 
counterbalanced by other conditions." One of those conditions was the 
requirement that the attacker approach the established position of the 
defender under disadvantageous conditions "arising from the obstacles to 
be crossed before reaching the enemy's line.
The key to victory for the army fighting the offensive battle lay 
in breaking the defensive position of the enemy by either piercing or 
turning his line of battle. As Mahan put it, "An enemy may be made to 
abandon a defensive position, either by driving him from it; or by 
manoeuvring to turn it, and so force him to fall back to secure his line 
of communications." The process to accomplish this involved first 
determining the decisive point of the field, defined by Jomini to be 
that point "the possession of which, more, than any other, helps to 
secure the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application 
of the principles of war." Mahan's approach to the subject of decisive 
points was decidedly more practical. He said, "In planning the attack 
of a position, attention must, in the first place, be directed to those 
points in which its main-strength resides, and for this reason termed 
the key-points.” Both Jomini and Halleck believed that the decisive or 
key-point was "determined by the configuration of the ground, the 
position of the contending forces, the strategic object of the battle; 
or, by a combination of these."7 Notwithstanding what or where the 
decisive point might be, it was hoped that once this key to the 
defensive position was taken by assault or made untenable by a flanking
6Jomini, 72-73, 186; Halleck, 116.
7 Halleck, 116, 121; Jomini, 186-87; Mahan, Out-post, 70-71.
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maneuver, the enemy would have either been used up and broken in the 
process or would be required to attempt a withdrawal which would present 
an opportunity for his final destruction.
Although fighting a battle on the defensive was somewhat less 
attractive to the mid-nineteenth century commander than fighting it on 
the offensive, it was still recognized that there were times and 
conditions in war which would render it necessary and even advisable to 
do so. Jomini counseled that "an army may often find it proper to await 
the enemy at a favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand 
for the purpose of there fighting a defensive battle." Mahan was even 
more emphatic in his support of the defensive battle saying that, "When 
the ground presents natural or artificial obstacles to the enemy's 
progress, and our troops are well disciplined and steady, it will 
perhaps be best to select our position, and sustain the enemy's 
attack."8
But the counsel of the military theorists in favor of the 
defensive battle was not without qualification. They were quick to 
point out that, for an army fighting a defensive battle, victory would 
not result merely by preventing the attacking army from piercing or 
turning the defensive position. Jomini called attention to the fact 
that no matter how strong a position or the army defending it might be, 
a way could always be found to attack it successfully. He said, "A 
general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping strictly on 
the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give way when 
properly attacked." But Jomini did not stop there. He went on to say
8Jomini, 180; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 11.
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that an army fighting a defensive battle might first profit "by all the 
advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to take the 
offensive when occasion offers, . . . may hope for the greatest 
success." This hope, and therefore, the real objective of the defensive 
battle, was that the strength of the defensive position and the action 
of the army occupying it would so disrupt and weaken the attacking army 
during its assault that the defending army could then move forward in an 
attack of its own. Mahan pointed out that in the course of a normal 
assault, the enemy would arrive at a "certain point, when, exhausted by 
his first efforts, he will be unable to repel our attack, which should 
be vigorously made." In grand tactics, then, the defensive battle was 
seen as a prelude to the defensive army taking the offensive for itself. 
It was only in this way that any decisive results could be achieved 
while on the defensive. In summing up the essentials of fighting the 
defensive battle, Jomini went so far as to say that "the best thing for 
an army standing on the defensive is to know how to take the offensive 
at a proper time, and to take it.
The third type of battle, the unexpected battle, was a special 
case in which the contending armies met abruptly while on the march, 
neither having a particular position initially. But other than 
recognizing that battles could occur in this manner, the theorists of 
grand tactics did not treat the unexpected battle as a separate type. 
No specific set of rules was developed in grand tactics for fighting the 
unexpected battle as were developed for fighting the offensive and 
defensive battles, since after the initial meeting one side would
9Jomini, 183, 185; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 11.
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quickly take the offensive because of some chance advantage, while the 
other side would just as quickly take the defensive. Jomini noted that, 
"In every battle one party must be the assailant and the other assailed. 
Every battle is hence offensive for one party and defensive for the 
other.
Regardless of whether the decisive battle was to be fought as an 
offensive or defensive action, the first order of business in grand 
tactics was the selection of a position. Mahan wrote that the tactical 
systems that grew out of the French Revolution gave great prominence to 
topography and that the term position would be applied "to any ground 
taken up by a body of troops either to make, or to receive an attack." 
The requirement for selecting a good position on the ground was 
especially important when the army was to fight the battle on the 
defensive, for it meant selecting the actual ground on which at least 
the initial stages of the battle would be fought. The basic 
requirements of a good position included a limited number of avenues for 
the enemy's approach, without greatly limiting the possibilities for 
moving friendly troops forward against the enemy's position; good 
observation and fields of fire for artillery forward of the position and 
to its flanks so that the enemy might not approach unseen cr unassailed; 
sufficient room for maneuver of the army out of view of the enemy; 
flanks well protected by natural or artificial obstacles; and, in case 
of disaster, avenues of retreat that would aid the army in its escape
Jomini, 179, 186; Halleck, 115.
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while not exposing it to destruction. The military theorists realized 
and readily admitted that it would be a rare case when all of these 
requirements could be satisfied at one time, so Jomini summed up the 
rules for selecting a position by saying that it, "should offer as many 
advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the principal 
strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles presented by its 
features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy than for the 
assailed."11
The next consideration was the plan for the placement of the 
troops on the position. The prevailing concept of battle was that at 
the beginning the opposing armies would be arrayed opposite each other 
in either a line of battle or an order of battle. The line of battle 
and the order of battle both referred to the specific manner in which 
the various units of an army were posted on the ground, relative to one 
another, as determined by the battle plan of the army commander. Both 
Jomini and Halleck, however, made a point of differentiating between the 
line of battle and the order of battle by saying that generally the line 
of battle was the position taken up by an army intending to await the 
attack of the enemy or when the commander was as yet undetermined as to 
his specific course of action, while the order of battle was the 
arrangement of an army made with the intention of conducting a specific 
maneuver. Thus, in grand tactics the term line of battle usually 
implied a defensive arrangement of troops, while order of battle implied 
that the army would be fighting the battle offensively. However, as 
Jomini pointed out the differentiation of the terms "line of battle" and
11Mahan, Out-post, 63-65; Jomini, 181-82; Halleck, 115; Mahan, 
Composition of Armies, 14-15.
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"order of battle" was not always so particular, but seemed to him 
"necessary to keeping up a proper distinction between two things which 
should by no means be confounded.
In both the line of battle and the order of battle three echelons 
of troops were required; the advanced-guard or line of skirmishers, the 
main body, and the reserve. The advanced-guard, the first echelon, was 
posted closest to the enemy and, traditionally, was to be composed of 
the regimental flank companies, that is the grenadier and the light 
infantry or rifle companies. The reality of the 1850s, though, was that 
all infantry companies were trained in the skirmish drill and could be 
assigned this duty. The mission of the advanced-guard or skirmishers 
was to hold the enemy in check, preventing the near approach of his 
skirmishers and, thus, the enemy's close observation of the army's 
position. Skirmishers could also be posted to fill intervals in the 
main line and to help in protecting the flanks of a position. According 
to Mahan, the distance of the advanced guard from the main body would 
depend upon the nature of the ground. Under normal circumstances the 
distance would be from 150 to 300 paces, but if the ground was such that 
the troops of the main body were masked from the enemy's fire, the 
distance could be reduced to 80 to 100 paces.
The second echelon, the main body, was established along the trace 
of the main position of the army and was, therefore, for all practical 
purposes synonymous with it. The main body was to consist of "an 
unbroken line of troops, from which a close and well-sustained fire can
12jomini, 179-80; Halleck, 117.
l^Halleck, 259; Mahan, Out-post, 40, 48-49; Jomini, 292.
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most part, this meant a double line of infantry battalions, with the 
battalions of the second line positioned so as to cover the normal 
intervals between the battalions on the front line. Heavy batteries of 
artillery would support the infantry from positions which would cover 
the main avenues of enemy approach and strengthen the weak points in the 
infantry line through fire. Halleck believed that, "The most favorable 
position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals between 
the regiments or brigades of the line, and far enough in advance of this 
line not to draw upon the other troops the fire of the enemy’s 
artillery." Mahan reiterated Halleck's advice pointing out that "cannon 
will always attract the fire of cannon to it."14 As a last 
consideration, the main line was initially to be positioned, as much as 
possible, out of sight of the enemy so as not to expose the troops 
unnecessarily to hostile fire.
The reserve, the last echelon, was to be made up of the most 
reliable troops, for their role in the battle might well determine the 
difference between victory and defeat. According to Mahan, "The object 
of the reserve is to supply the want of strength in our line of battle, 
and this it does by coming to the aid of the troops first brought into 
action, when they are weakened, exhausted, and in a partial state of 
disorganization from a murderous struggle." The reserve was to be made 
up of units from all three of the combat arms. The infantry of the 
reserve could be formed as a third line, or centrally positioned as a 
body ready to move rapidly to any part of the main line which might
14Mahan, Out-post, 46, 49-50, 64, 66; Mahan, Composition of 
Annies, 12, 15; Jomini, 181, 287; Halleck, 115, 294.
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become threatened. The cavalry was considered a part of the reserve 
because it required momentum to fully develop its combat power and was, 
therefore, unsuitable for holding positions on the main line. The 
cavalry’s proper position in support of the army was in the vicinity of 
the flanks of the main line to help defend against the enemy's cavalry, 
although large bodies of cavalry were often positioned in the center for 
general support. The light batteries of the artillery were also 
considered part of the reserve, and were positioned behind the main line 
so that they might move quickly to the support of any threatened point, 
or to exploit any advantage. As with the advanced guard, the distance 
from the main body to the reserve could vary according to the terrain 
and, because the reserve was made up of units from the three combat 
arms, the distance would also vary according to the type of unit. The 
cardinal principle in positioning the reserve was its availability when 
needed. As Mahan put it, "A reserve for the support of a strong 
position should not be farther off than to arrive in time to succour it; 
in the contrary case it would be desirable to yield the position without 
fighting, and fall back on the reserve; otherwise we should expose 
ourselves to the worst of disasters by being beaten in detail.
Once the terrain was chosen and the army positioned, the army 
commander could properly turn his attention to the conduct of the 
battle. If his plan were to take the offensive, the enemy's position 
would be examined to determine the location of those decisive points 
where his line might be penetrated, or those where an attack would 
succeed by seizing a key terrain feature necessary to the cohesion of
1^Mahan, Composition of Armies, 13-14; Halleck, 125-27, 131, 263, 
271; Mahan, Out-post, 47, 49-50, 56-57; Jomini, 287, 289, 304.
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the enemy's defensive line. In determining what the decisive points of 
the battlefield were, the commander would consider not only the terrain 
which constituted the enemy's position, but the relative placement of 
his troops also. According to the theorists, if the enemy's line of 
battle was at all extended beyond the norm, the center would necessarily 
be weak because the troops on the flanks would be too distant from it to 
contribute their combat power to any fighting there either through their 
fire or by shock action. On the other hand, if the troops were disposed 
with the normal intervals between units, the line would be strong along 
its entire length. In this case, the weak points would most likely be 
on the flanks because the flanks could only be defended by a portion of 
the enemy's troops and because once past a flank the enemy's line of 
communications would usually be exposed. Thus, according to the doctrine 
of grand tactics, the flanks usually offered a greater possibility for 
successful assault than the center.^
Based on his examination of the terrain and the disposition of the 
enemy's forces, and considering the rationale offered by the theorists, 
a single point would be selected by the army commander to be the 
objective of the main attack. A single point of attack was selected 
because, lacking overwhelmingly superior forces, piercing or turning the 
enemy's linear position would require the assaulting army to develop 
superior strength at the decisive point by a massing of assault forces 
at that point. Otherwise, the battle would be fought equally along the 
whole of the line leaving to chance the point at which the line might be 
broken, if at all. Jomini was quick to point out that an attack which
l^Jomini, 187; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 6,15-16; Mahan, Out­
post, 65, 71.
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was made in equal strength along the whole of the enemy's line "without 
having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the 
rules of the art." But while the main attack was almost always to be 
directed at this single key-point, it was also always to be combined 
with secondary attacks or demonstrations upon other points of the 
enemy's line. This was to prevent the enemy from withdrawing his troops 
from those parts of the line of battle not under assault to reinforce 
the point threatened by the main attack. Jomini's formula for the 
arrangement of the attacking forces was that an army commander should 
use "a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or watch his 
movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point the 
possession of which will insure him the victory."17
With the objective of the main attack determined, the army 
commander would next decide upon and array his army in the order of 
battle most suitable to his plan of attack. As defined by Halleck, "An 
order of battle is the particular disposition given to the troops for a 
determined manoeuvre on the field of battle." Arranging the army in an 
order of battle was the method by which the army commander translated 
into reality the principles of attacking the enemy position at the 
decisive point with overwhelmingly superior forces, while holding the 
majority of the enemy's line of battle in place with the remainder of 
the army. Developing the order of battle meant determining the initial 
formation of the main body in the movement to the assault, as well as 
that of the reserve and the advanced guard relative to it. In an era 
when the control of units in battle was accomplished by word of command
17Jomini, 186, 199-200; Halleck, 116, 121, 132; Mahan, Out-post, 
71; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 6, 14.
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or message delivered by a mounted staff officer, it was a matter of 
necessity that unit commanders understand their mission and the movement 
of their units in the assault in terms of the unit placement in the army 
order of battle. Its importance to the conduct of a successful assault 
could not have been understated by the theorists. Jomini saw selection 
of the proper order of battle as the means to a successful attack, and 
went to great lengths to demonstrate that his classifying of all the 
different possible offensive formations as orders of battle was "neither 
fanciful nor useless."1®
Both Jomini and Halleck listed twelve standard orders of battle 
(figure 1), beginning with the simple parallel order and advancing to 
more complex oblique, concave, and convex orders before concluding with 
various orders by echelons and column. Mahan opted for a simpler 
approach to the question of orders of battle by classifying only two: 
the parallel order and the oblique order. The number of standard orders 
of battle notwithstanding, the common essence of each, except for the 
parallel order, was that they provided a formation for the main body to 
approach the enemy line of battle with units massed in depth at some 
point, providing a superiority of forces at that point, together with 
other forces formed relative to them to threaten or demonstrate against 
the remainder of the enemy's line, holding it in position. The parallel 
order differed only in that there was no point in the formation where 
the assaulting forces were massed, and thus no point along the enemy's 
line of battle where superiority of force would be achieved, the 
situation which Jomini cautioned against as being "entirely in
■^Halleck, 117; Jomini, 188, 197.
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opposition to the rules of the art." Jomini also cautioned "that these 
different orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical 
figures indicate them."19 Rather they were to be taken in the sense of 
indicating the approximate line along which the units of the attacking 
army would be arranged and maneuvered during the battle.
Although the order of battle was critical to the conduct of a 
successful offensive battle, selection of the correct order was not a 
panacea which would guarantee a successful attack. Regardless of the 
order of battle, when the army was sent forward to the attack, other 
factors would have to be attended to by the commander. In particular, 
grand tactics and the state of the military art in the 1850s demanded 
that infantry, cavalry, and artillery be used in a proper sequence and 
combination to develop and apply the combat power which would make for a 
successful attack. Mahan taught that, "To concentrate our masses is not 
alone sufficient for success; we must also know how to bring them into 
action with effect." According to Jomini, the chief difficulty in 
arranging and conducting a successful attack was "to cause these 
fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive maneuver which, in 
accordance with the original plan of the battle, is to result in 
victory." Moreover, in the doctrine of grand tactics, the conduct of an 
offensive battle with regard to the use of the infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery followed a relatively predictable sequence of actions, 
although Halleck was quick to point out that, "The order of succession
^Jomini, 188-96, 200; Halleck, 117-20; Mahan, Composition of 
Armies, 11-12.
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in which the different arms are engaged in a battle, depends upon the 
nature of the ground and other accidental circumstances, and cannot be 
determined by any fixed rules.”20
With this in mind, the military theorists stated that the heavy 
batteries of artillery would most often open the offensive battle. The 
fire of these batteries was to be concentrated on the intended point of 
attack "with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a degree that 
he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate of the 
battle is to turn." Some of the fire of the heavy batteries, however, 
was to be directed toward silencing those artillery batteries of the 
enemy which might interfere with the advance of the formations of the 
main attack.21
Next, the light infantry or skirmishers were to move forward to 
prepare the way for the assault forces by engaging the enemy's 
skirmishers and causing them to fall back onto their own main line. 
When this was accomplished, the light infantry would continue to move 
forward taking up positions from whence they could harass the enemy's 
main line, especially by trying to pick off the gunners of the enemy's 
artillery batteries.22
At this point, Mahan believed that the light artillery batteries 
could be sent rapidly forward, taking up positions within as little as 
two hundred yards of the enemy's main line, but not so close as to be
2®Mahan, Composition of Armies, 6; Jomini, 196; Halleck, 131.
21Jomini, 202, 290, 316-17; Halleck, 128, 131, 290; Mahan, 
Composition of Armies, 14; Mahan, Out-post, 61-62, 72.
22Jomini, 292; Halleck, 131, 259; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 
14; Mahan, Out-post, 51, 72, 191.
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within effective range of the muskets of the enemy’s infantry 
battalions. These batteries would concentrate upon the point of assault 
with canister in an effort to create a gap in the enemy’s line into 
which the infantry could successfully assault. In this effort, the 
light batteries had to be closely supported by the light infantry and 
the main infantry assault columns so as to prevent destruction or 
capture of the batteries by a quick sortie of the enemy's infantry or
cavalry.23
As soon as a gap or any wavering appeared in the enemy's line, the 
main attack force would be called to the assault. As was stipulated for 
a main body, this attack force would be made up of two lines or echelons 
of infantry battalions, supported by the reserve. These battalions 
would move forward from the main line closely behind and in support of 
the light infantry and the light artillery, and, as much as possible, 
would move forward by covered routes avoiding exposure to the enemy's 
artillery fire and remaining just far enough behind the light infantry 
and artillery so as to be out of effective range of the infantry 
battalions of the enemy's main line. As the assault began, the light 
infantry would fall back on the battalions of the assault force, taking 
up positions on the flanks or in the intervals between them. The light 
artillery also would move to the flanks taking up new positions from 
where the batteries could continue to support the assault by fire and
23jomini, 316; Halleck, 291; Dennis Hart Mahan, A Treatise on 
Field Fortification, Containing Instructions on the Methods of Laying 
Out, Constructing, Defending, and Attacking Intrenchments, with the 
General Outlines also of the Arrangement, the Attack and Defense of 
Permanent Fortifications, 3rd ed., (New York: John Wiley, 1852), xxiv; 
Mahan, Out-post, 45-47, 62, 72.
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from where they would be in position to cover the withdrawal of the 
infantry should the assault fail.24
One of the major military questions of the 1850s involved the 
manner in which the final assault should be conducted. Unlike cavalry, 
which fought by shock action alone, or artillery, which fought by fire 
alone, the infantry was capable of producing combat power through either 
fire or shock action, giving commanders a choice as to which should be 
employed in attempting to drive the enemy from his position. If the 
infantry assault force came forward in deployed lines, it would be able 
to best employ the fire of its muskets in the assault. However, if the 
assault battalions remained in a column formation, then an assault with 
the bayonet would be most effective. Jomini wrote that "the real 
question now is, shall the line of battle consist of deployed battalions 
depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of attack, each 
battalion . . . depending on its force and impetuosity?" In this 
context, both Jomini and Halleck suggested and discussed four methods of 
making the final infantry assault: in a shallow order of deployed lines, 
by battalions in columns by division or squares, in a mixed order of 
deployed lines and small columns, or in a deep order of heavy columns 
composed of several battalions.2^
An assault made in the shallow order of two deployed lines meant 
that the battalions of both echelons of the assault force would come 
forward with their companies on line, each company in the line of battle 
formation of two or three ranks (figure 2) . In this formation, every
24Jomini, 188, 303; Halleck, 132; Mahan, Out-post, 51, 72-73.
25Jomini, 291-92; Halleck, 121-22.
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soldier of the battalions of the first line would be able to fire his 
musket at the enemy line of battle when the command was given, thus 
employing to the maximum the firepower capability of the assault 
battalions.
Although in the past, the deployed line had been the principal 
formation in the conduct of battle, the military theorists of the 1850s 
had serious reservations regarding its use in the assault. To begin 
with, they did not believe that the battalions could move any distance 
in a long line of battle without causing confusion. Halleck wrote that 
"reason and experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or 
light order can move only very slowly; that in attempting rapid 
movements it breaks and exhibits great and dangerous undulations." 
Jomini backed him up by discussing the likely results of a movement to 
the assault made in the shallow order. He wrote, "Suppose the attempt 
[be] made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, . . .  to the 
assault of a well defended position: it is not very probable they would 
ever reach the desired point, or, if they did, it would be in about as 
good order as a flock of sheep."26
Their second objection to an assault made with battalions in 
deployed order concerned the ability of the soldiers to fire while on 
the move. Jomini pointed out that "when a position is to be carried it 
can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and marching and firing at 
the same time can be done only by troops as skirmishers, being an 
impossibility for the principal masses." Jomini posed the question to 
his readers; "Can an immense deployed line be moved into action while
^Halleck, 122; Jomini, 292, 298.
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firing?" and settled the issue himself by saying, "I think no one will 
answer affirmatively." The problem, of course, was the meticulous 
procedure and number of steps required in the loading and firing of the 
musket. To load and fire in an efficient and timely manner required 
that the soldier be stationary, and, as Jomini pointed out, the process 
of assault could only be accomplished by moving forward. But neither 
did the theorists care to consider allowing the deployed battalions to 
take up a stationary position before the enemy line of battle and 
attempt to break it by fire alone. Jomini told his readers that an 
assault "depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the 
other party takes to its heels" was "a case not likely to happen."21
The last objection of the theorists to an assault in the shallow 
order was that the formation lacked strength. Halleck and Mahan each 
pointed out that the principal strength of the infantry of the line was 
that it acted in masses. But in the line of battle formation, much of 
the strength of the mass was lost. Consequently, in using the shallow 
order in the assault of the enemy's position, there was great risk that 
as the battalions arrived within effective musket range of the enemy's 
line, their thin line of battle would be vulnerable to a charge by the 
enemy's infantry in battalion column or by his cavalry.28
The second method of assault, that made with the battalions either 
in columns by division or squares, was the one overwhelmingly preferred 
by all of the theorists because these column formations offered the 
characteristics of solidity, mobility, momentum, and mass which were
27Jomini, 203, 298, 302; Halleck, 124.
^Halleck, 122, 260; Mahan, Out-post, 41; Jomini, 298.
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absolutely required if the bayonet was to be used effectively in the 
assault.29 in a battalion column by division (figure 3), two line 
companies, forming a division, would be drawn up side by side, each 
company in the line of battle formation. The remaining six line 
companies, forming three more divisions in the same way, would be 
arranged in column behind the first division with the normal intervals 
between the divisions, front to rear, reduced to three paces. The 
resulting battalion column by division, closed in mass, was a compact 
but easily controlled and highly maneuverable formation offering the 
solidity, mobility, momentum, and mass which the theorists required for 
the assault. The other column formation, the battalion square, could be 
formed in two ways (figure 4): as a true square with two companies on 
each of the four sides, or in an elongated square with three companies 
on the front and rear sides and one company each on the outward facing 
sides. The square was also a compact, controllable and maneuverable 
formation, but offered a slightly reduced measure of solidity, mobility, 
momentum, and mass.
Unlike the battalion deployed in line of battle, the battalion 
in column by division or square could be moved rapidly to the point of 
the assault without breaking or causing confusion within the mass. 
Unlike the larger columns, yet to be discussed, these column formations 
did not present an unacceptably large target for artillery, which in 
combination with their mobility offered the possibility of successfully 
crossing a zone of artillery fire that could not otherwise be avoided. 
These formations also did not preclude the use of fire in the assault.
29jomini, 297; Halleck, 124, 260; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 
12; Mahan, Out-post, 41.
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The column by division and the true square kept two companies forward 
which were capable of delivering a volley as they approached the enemy's 
line of battle, while the elongated square had three companies in the 
forward position. In considering the firing capability of battalions 
assaulting in the column or square formation, it should be kept in mind 
that a battalion would not approach the enemy line of battle 
individually, but rather as part of a line of battalions in column or 
square which would have an equal capability of delivering their fire. 
In addition, the two skirmishing companies of each of the battalions 
would return at this point to fill the gaps between the battalions and 
would also be capable of delivering their fire along with the rest of 
their battalion making a total of either four or five companies capable 
of firing in each of the assaulting battalions. Jomini counseled, 
however, that, "While searching after methods of obtaining more fire 
when necessary, we must not forget that a column of attack is not 
intended to fire, and that its fire should be reserved until the last; 
for if it begins to fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of 
its forward movement is lost."30
That impulsive effect of forward movement was the principal 
advantage of the battalion column and square because an assault in these 
formations was intended to end in a charge with the bayonet against the 
enemy's line of battle. In the military terminology of the day, a 
charge meant advancing with the bayonet to drive the enemy from his 
position. According to Scott in his memoirs, "An actual crossing of 
bayonets, therefore, is not indispensable to the idea of a charge." The
^Ojomini, 294.
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charge itself was not a free-for-all forward rush, but a carefully 
controlled rapid forward movement of the full battalion acting as one 
mass and delivering with its collective full force a front of leveled 
and dressed bayonets upon the now weakened formations of the enemy's 
main line. The theorists felt that such a charge by a properly formed 
and directed column of infantry was nearly irresistible. Mahan went so 
far as to write, "A charge by a column, when the enemy is within 50 
paces, will prove effective, if resolutely made." Halleck wrote that 
the moral effect produced by the charge of an infantry column was such 
"that they frequently carry positions without ever employing their 
fire." Jomini cited the example that, "In the later wars in Europe, 
positions have often been carried by Russian, French, and Prussian 
columns with their arms at a shoulder and without firing a shot.
Of the two formations, the column by division and the square, the 
theorists were decidedly in favor of the column as the formation of the 
assault. Mahan instructed his West Point cadets that, "in the attack of 
the decisive point the formation should be entirely in columns of 
battalions by divisions, as this formation has more solidity, and can 
receive a greater impulsion than a displayed line." Jomini was willing 
to go so far as to say, "These small columns have succeeded wherever I 
have seen them tried." And Halleck wrote, "That the attack by 
battalions in columns by division is the best for carrying a position." 
The battalion square formation was deemed by the theorists to be an 
acceptable assault formation under certain conditions; for example, if 
the battle took place on a plain and the enemy was strong in cavalry.
^Scott, Memoirs, 132; Mahan, Out-post, 50; Halleck, 124; Jomini,
297.
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But Jomini and Halleck ultimately concluded that for the assault the 
square was not "so good as the c o l u m n ."32
In outlining the possible methods for the infantry in the final 
assault, Jomini stated that, "An order of battle would be perfect which 
united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and the moral 
effect produced by an onset." So it was that the third method of 
assault that the theorists considered, a mixed order of the deployed 
line and the column by division (figure 5), was an attempt at combining 
both firepower and shock action in the final assault. In this method, 
the battalions of the first line would come forward in a column 
formation, deploying into line of battle just before coming into musket 
range of the enemy's main line. The battalions of the second line would 
remain in column by division and would closely follow and support the 
first line as it deployed. As the final assault began, the battalions 
of the first line would attempt to weaken the enemy line of battle with 
their fire. When this fire was developed to its fullest, the battalions 
of the second line would move forward, through the intervals of the 
first line, to make the final assault with the bayonet. A variation on 
this concept brought the two assault lines together in formations of 
three battalions where one deployed battalion was in the center with two 
other battalions in column by division on its flanks and on line with 
it, adding the firepower of four companies to the front of each three 
battalion assaulting formation. The intent was that the battalions in 
column by division would cease firing and go forward at the proper time 
to make the bayonet assault. Jomini cautioned, however, that with this
32Mahan, Composition of Armies, 12; Jomini, 296-98; Halleck, 123,
125.
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variation, "There may be reason to fear that, these divisions becoming 
actively engaged in firing, their battalions which are formed in column 
to be readily launched against the enemy may not be easily disengaged
for that purpose.”33
Although in the assault, the mixed order seemed to effectively 
combine the firepower of the deployed line with the imperative shock 
action of the small column, it was not necessarily more favored by the 
theorists for the final assault than the order made up entirely of small 
columns. Jomini commented favorably on this method of assault by saying 
that although he had only seen it executed in practice, "it seems to me 
an irresistible combination of the advantages of firing and of the 
column." Halleck was more reserved in his appraisal of this method 
saying that it "has sometimes been employed with success" and that it 
"has many advocates, and in certain situations may be employed with 
great advantage."34
The final method of assault considered by the theorists was the 
deep order or heavy column composed of up to twelve battalions. This 
method had been extensively used for assaults during the later battles 
of the Napoleonic Wars and was still popular among many military 
professionals in the 1850s. There were at least two methods of forming 
this heavy column (figure 6). In the first, the battalions formed a 
column of battalions with each battalion in the line of battle formation 
and the distance between the battalions front to rear reduced, resulting 
in a mass one battalion wide and twelve battalions or up to thirty-six
33jomini, 201, 295; Halleck, 123.
34Jomini, 301; Halleck, 123.
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ranks deep. Jomini recommended a variation on this formation where two 
of the battalions were to march by files on the flanks of the formation 
to guard it from attack by the enemy’s infantry or cavalry. The second 
method was to form two smaller columns of six battalions each in the 
same manner and then to place them side by side, making a formation two 
battalions wide and six battalions or eighteen ranks deep.35
There was no question among the theorists that this last method of 
assault was generally unacceptable. Because of its great mass, the deep 
order was slower in movement than the battalion column, and almost 
unmaneuverable except for its forward motion. Both Jomini and Halleck 
agreed that the heavy column "is objectionable as an habitual formation 
for battle, inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages of 
artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of an attack 
without adding greatly to its force." Mahan believed that, "In a very 
deep order, the troops readily become huddled by any inequality of 
motion; the head alone fights; disorder easily creeps into the mass; and 
a fire of artillery on it causes the most frightful ravages." Jomini 
added the final note when he said that, "The order in very deep masses 
is certainly the most injudicious."36
Given whatever formation had been chosen by the commander, if the 
assault on the enemy’s forward line of battle were successful, one more 
obstacle remained to be dealt with. This was the second line of the 
enemy's main body and his reserve. The second line of battle would be 
dealt with in much the same manner as the first had been in the final
Jomini, 295-96; Halleck, 123-24.
3®Halleck, 123-24; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 12; Jomini, 295.
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assault. The theorists, however, did not think it likely that the 
troops who had made the final assault upon the enemy's first line would 
be in condition to make a strong assault upon his second. Therefore, 
Jomini cautioned and recommended to the commander conducting the 
offensive battle, "that the most difficult as well as the most certain 
of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in 
strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, 
and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of 
cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the 
second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all 
problems of the tactics of battles." Jomini went on to point out that 
in this attack upon the second line, "theory becomes an uncertain guide; 
for it then is unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value 
with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that 
intuitive coup-d'oeil imparted by experience in battles to a general of 
tried bravery and coolness."37
Once the infantry assault had successfully pierced the enemy's 
main line or wrested from him his key terrain, it was time for the 
cavalry to go to work. The heavy cavalry, massed in a column formation, 
would at once charge the disordered enemy infantry before they had 
sufficient time to reestablish the full solidarity of their formations. 
It was in such situations that the massive, mobile shock action of the 
cavalry was most useful and most effective. Although the theorists 
hinted at the use of cavalry during the assault on the enemy's main line 
to help weaken it and to increase confusion, it was specifically agreed
37Jomini, 202-3.
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upon among them that cavalry could have little or no effect upon 
infantry unless the infantry were drawn up in the shallow order or was 
otherwise in a state of disorganization and confusion. Jomini wrote 
that "a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order cannot be 
attempted with much hope of success," and Halleck was convinced that 
"good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of 
cavalry." Accordingly, it was important that the cavalry be close at 
hand at this point during the offensive battle to take full advantage of 
the success wrought by the infantry assault. With the enemy formations 
now hopelessly broken, the light cavalry would be sent in against the 
fleeing survivors of the enemy’s army to destroy any possibility of a 
rally. To complete the victory, it was only necessary that the 
commander direct his army in a vigorous and boldly conducted pursuit of 
the enemy army to insure its complete dispersal.38
In the properly conducted offensive battle the use of infantry, 
cavalry and artillery in combination was critical to success. The 
essence of the offensive battle was the selection of the decisive point 
of the enemy's main line and the conduct of an assault against that 
point so as to pierce or turn it. In this assault, the infantry was the 
principal instrument because of its ability to develop superior combat 
power through the fire of its muskets and the shock action of its 
columns with the bayonet. In the offensive battle, though, the musket 
proved to be of limited value because the effects of musketry fire were 
often limited or slow in realization, especially for formations on the 
move. In order to use the musket, assault formations would have to cane
38jomini, 202, 242, 304-5; Halleck 125, 132, 264, 270-72; Mahan, 
Composition of Armies, 1; Mahan, Out-post, 45, 58, 73.
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to a complete halt, sacrificing their momentum. Consequently, the 
professional officers of the 1850s were very much wed to the use of the 
bayonet over the musket in the assault, and the final assault was to be 
an infantry charge made with the bayonet.
A battle fought on the defensive was also a matter of the use of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery in proper combination, with the 
infantry again playing the main role. In the defensive battle, the army 
would be deployed on the battlefield in a line of battle of three 
echelons as has already been explained. As with the offensive battle, 
the defensive battle would be opened by the light infantry, acting as 
the skirmishers of the first echelon. These light troops would attempt 
to hold back the enemy's assault force and to protect the forward 
artillery positions as long as possible before withdrawing to take up 
positions on the flanks and in the intervals between the battalions of 
the main line.39
The next phase of the defensive battle belonged to the artillery. 
Artillery batteries were to be positioned in the defense so as to cover 
every possible enemy avenue of approach in such a manner that they would 
be mutually supportive of one another and capable of concentrating their 
fire upon the assault columns of the enemy as they advanced. The heavy 
batteries would be in position closest to the main line but, in many 
cases, would be well forward of it to "obtain a good sweep of the avenue 
of approach," and to avoid drawing the fire of the enemy's artillery
39Halleck, 259; Mahan, Out-post, 49-50.
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onto the infantry formations of the main line. The lighter batteries, 
due to their greater mobility, could be placed even farther forward of 
the main line. A reserve of light batteries— horse artillery, if 
possible— was withheld and positioned "to be thrown upon any point where 
the enemy's progress threatens danger; or to be used in covering the 
retreat." As the columns of the enemy's assault force started their 
move forward, they were to be subjected to the concentrated fire of all 
the batteries within range. As these columns continued their advance, 
the light batteries could be thrown forward to direct their fire into 
the flanks of these columns. 0^
If the concentration of artillery fire did not stop the advance of 
the enemy's columns of assault, the forward artillery batteries would be 
withdrawn and the responsibility for stopping the assault would pass to 
the infantry of the main line. In the defensive battle, the questions 
of fire versus shock action and column versus line which had been raised 
relative to the method of assault in the offensive battle were also to 
be considered in choosing a method of forming the infantry of the 
defensive main line. According to the theorists, a defensive line of 
battle required depth, so the infantry of the main line was always to be 
formed in two lines. The four methods that had been considered for 
forming infantry in the assault were also to be considered for forming 
infantry on the main line in the defensive battle as well: that is, in 
deployed lines, by battalions in small columns or squares, in the mixed
^Mahan, Out-post, 46, 60-61, 68; Jomini, 289-90, 316-17; Halleck, 
115, 128-29; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 12; Mahan, Treatise on Field 
Fortification, xxii.
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order of deployed lines and small columns, or in heavy columns of 
several battalions.
Jomini correctly pointed out that because the infantry of the 
defensive main line were generally stationary, "the fire of musketry can 
be much more effectively used than in the offensive." Accordingly, the 
formation of two deployed lines was more attractive as a method of 
defense than it had been as a method of assault. Deployed lines allowed 
for producing the greatest possible volume of fire, and, since they 
would be stationary, the question of them breaking and causing confusion 
during movement did not have to be considered. The deployed line was 
also the formation that would be least susceptible to the effects of 
artillery fire. But the theorists did not necessarily believe that fire 
alone would be able to stop an assault. Accordingly, the deployed line 
as the defensive formation presented a problem in that it was easily 
pierced through by a column of charging infantry or cavalry and, thus, 
was not recommended for the defense.^1
A defensive main line made up of small battalion columns or 
squares was considered a good method of defense, especially if the enemy 
were strong in cavalry. Halleck wrote that, "The formation of squares 
is exceedingly effective in an open country, and against an enemy who is 
superior in c a v a l r y . "^2 if small columns were used, a balance of fire 
and solidarity of formation through depth could be achieved, especially 
if the second line battalions were positioned to cover the intervals 
between the battalions of the first line. But in small columns, the
Jomini, 203, 302; Mahan, Out-post, 49; Halleck, 122, 126.
^Halleck, 123; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 13.
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battalions of the first line at least would be vulnerable to the effects 
of artillery fire, more so than if battalion squares were used.
The mixed order of first line deployed and second line in small 
columns was the method most favored by the theorists for the defense. 
Jomini believed that,
The object of the defense being to break and throw into 
confusion the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of 
artillery and musketry will be the natural defensive means of 
the first line, and when the enemy presses too closely the 
columns of the second line and part of the cavalry must be 
launched against him. There will then be a strong probability
of his repulse.
The mixed order best fit this formula of defense because as the 
enemy's assault columns approached, the muskets of the deployed 
battalions of the front line could be used to the maximum extent 
possible to stop the assault, or, at the very least, to reduce the 
strength of the attacking formations before they were close enough to 
make a bayonet assault. Up to the point where the enemy assault columns 
were ready to begin their charge, the deployed front line would have the 
advantage because it was stationary and could produce a greater volume 
of fire than the attacking columns, which, because they were moving 
forward, would be unable to effectively return the fire without halting 
and sacrificing the momentum of the assault. However, once the 
assaulting columns were close enough to execute a charge with the 
bayonet, the forward deployed line of battalions would be at a serious 
disadvantage because their thin line of battle could not hope to 
withstand the mass and momentum of the charging enemy columns. This was 
the reason for forming the second line of battalions in column by
43jomini, 203.
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division. As the enemy columns were about to charge— or, for that 
matter if they showed any wavering while under fire— the battalions of 
the second line would quickly move through the intervals of the forward 
line and assault the oncoming enemy columns with the bayonet. If 
successful, this countercharge would break up the enemy's assault 
formations and force him to retire back across the field in disorder. 
Mahan felt that such a countercharge resolutely made would surely prove 
effective.
The last method of formation, the heavy column of multiple 
battalions, was no more favored by the theorists for use in the 
defensive battle than it had been in the offensive, and perhaps even 
less so. The chief objection remained the vulnerability of this massive 
column to the fire of artillery. If used in the defensive, this 
formation would be stationary and, therefore, present an even better 
target for the enemy's gunners. Additionally, only one battalion in 
twelve would be able to effectively use its firepower while in this 
formation; a poor ratio considering that the theorists recognized 
firepower as of significant value in the defense.
If the main defensive line failed to stop the enemy's assaulting 
columns, then the cavalry and the reserve could be used to save the day. 
The major role of the reserve in the defensive battle was to guard 
against the disaster of an enemy penetration of the main line of battle. 
Mahan believed that in the case of a penetration, the reserve, formed in 
column by division, could and should use its bayonets "to strike a last 
and decisive blow." But timing was critical, "If engaged too soon, the
44Ibid., 298-99; Halleck, 125; Mahan, Out-post, 50, 68.
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resistance offered to the reserve may prevent its making a decisive 
blow; if not engaged in time, the main-body may be too far exhausted and 
disorganized to rally." The cavalry would also prove to be most useful 
in blocking or turning back enemy troops which had broken through the 
main line. Jomini counseled that the cavalry by its great power of 
shock action "may regain the advantages lost, change the face of 
affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by 
his own success."4^
The success of the troops of the main line in turning back the 
enemy’s assault columns did not mean victory, nor even the end of the 
battle. As has already been discussed, in grand tactics the repulse of 
the enemy's assault formations signaled the moment for the defensive 
army to take the offensive for itself. In this effort, the cavalry and 
the reserve would play the key role. Mahan taught that, "The cavalry 
must be in readiness, from its position, to act promptly, either against 
any attempt upon the flanks of the infantry; or to profit by any faults, 
or disorder of the enemy. "4*> With the enemy's assault columns retiring 
in disorder, the charge of a column of cavalry could be used to further 
crush them and insure that they did not rally to establish a defensive 
position of their own. The reserve was to be sent immediately forward 
also to press the retiring enemy army while the forces of the main line 
were being rallied and reordered so that they might move forward as soon 
as possible.
4%ahan, Out-post, 50-51; Jomini, 306.
4%ahan, Out-post, 69.
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Before ending this discussion of the defensive battle, a word must be 
added concerning the role of entrenchments in the field. Many works 
were written by military engineers of the mid-nineteenth century on the 
science and construction of fortifications. For the most part, 
fortifications were to be used for the protection and security of 
permanent installations and major centers of population and civil 
government. They were locations upon which the field army could fall 
back on in the case of defeat on the field of battle during a campaign. 
But the attitude of the professional soldier toward the use of 
fortifications and even entrenchments by an army in the field was 
something quite apart from his attitude toward permanent fortifications. 
Of the three military theorists considered in this chapter, Halleck 
spoke most positively concerning field fortifications when he said that 
they "are properly confined to the operations of a single campaign, and 
are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a 
short period." He went on to say that although entrenchments were 
merely inert objects, they should "be regarded as most valuable and 
important accessaries in the defense of a position." Mahan, the author 
of numerous works on fortification, was much less positive concerning 
the use of field fortifications by troops engaged in a campaign in the 
field. He wrote, "When a position is weak, from the nature of the 
ground, it may be strengthened by intrenchments, abattis, inundations 
etc; or else a partial remedy may be found in the choice of the order of 
battle; but, in general, it will be safest not to trust to such whatever 
other advantages they may present." In speaking of entrenched 
positions in the field, Jomini was even more negative than Mahan and 
more correctly conveyed the attitude of the professional officer of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1850s when he wrote, "A general and soldiers who seek refuge behind 
lines are already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive 
does not occur to them when their intrenchments are attacked.n47 So it 
was that entrenched positions found little place in the doctrine of 
grand tactics. The honor of the officers, the soldiers, the army 
demanded that the enemy be faced and fought in the open field according 
to the rules and procedures laid down in the manuals of tactics and 
grand tactics.
On the theoretical battlefields of the 1850s, as envisioned by 
Scott and as described and taught by Jomini, Mahan, and Halleck, the 
chief ingredient of victory was the proper application of shock action; 
in practical terms, the effective use of the bayonet by a properly 
formed and directed infantry battalion. The role of firepower, to be 
sure, was increasing, but was professionally recognized as being 
subordinate, at best a necessary preparative, to the results that could 
be achieved through shock action. In the offensive battle, the 
application of firepower to break the enemy's line was difficult in the 
extreme. To fire on the enemy's line, artillery batteries had to be 
moved forward and established on ground already covered by the fire of 
the enemy's positioned batteries. The infantry also had to perform 
evolutions of drill under the enemy's fire before it could begin to 
return effective fire. Thus it was that the easiest, swiftest, most 
effective, and the final assault on the enemy's line was the one made
47Halleck, 343-44; Mahan, Composition of Armies, 15; Jomini, 215.
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with the bayonet. In the defensive battle, firepower played a more 
significant role in achieving victory largely because the firepower of 
both the artillery and the infantry could be more effectively developed 
and applied with the units placed in preselected, stationary positions. 
But even during the defensive battle, the critical blows that determined 
the difference between victory and defeat were the blows of shock action 
delivered by properly massed and controlled infantry formations using 
the bayonet.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPROVEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY 
1855-1861
In 1855, the art and science of warfare was at a high point. 
While the limited range and the lack of accuracy of the firearms of the 
day meant that firepower could not be relied upon to render the final 
decision in battle, the systems of minor and grand tactics that had 
evolved over the years blended firepower with shock action in a 
complementary fashion that permitted the capabilities of infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery to be maximized on the battlefield. But this 
harmony between weapons, units, and tactics was not to be long lived. 
Advances in small arms technology were already beginning to upset the 
balance.
In the first of these advances, the U.S. Army Ordnance Board 
adopted in 1841 for use with the Army's small arms, the percussion 
system of ignition to replace the flintlock system which had been the 
military and civilian standard far longer than the United States had 
been a nation. The first U.S Army weapons to use percussion ignition 
were the Model 1841 Rifle^ and the Model 1842 Musket.
1 After 1847, this weapon would be known as the "Mississippi" rifle 
because of its use during the War with Mexico by a regiment of 
Mississippi riflemen under to command of Colonel Jefferson Davis.
75
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The percussion ignition system was a great improvement over the 
flintlock. In loading a flintlock musket or rifle, the soldier primed 
the lock of the weapon by shaking some of the powder from his cartridge 
into the pan and closing the frizzen over it before he proceeded with 
loading the barrel. During this process, the open pan and the powder 
were fully exposed to the elements. Wet powder, of course, would not 
ignite, so successfully priming a flintlock during wet weather was all 
but impossible. Even if the weather were ideal, other factors in the 
operation of the flintlock could cause it to misfire. The flintlock 
used a sharpened flint clamped in the jaws of the lock's hammer to 
produce sparks which would ignite the charge of priming power. When 
released by the trigger, the hammer fell forward forcing the sharp edge 
of the harder-than-steel flint against the vertical face of the steel 
frizzen. As the flint struck the frizzen, it produced sparks by 
striping off small pieces of steel from the face of the frizzen, and at 
the same time caused the frizzen to fall back, opening the pan and 
exposing the priming powder. The sparks would then fall into the pan, 
igniting the priming powder which, in turn, would ignite the main powder 
charge in the barrel through a small hole located next to the pan. If 
the flint were not sharp or were improperly positioned, the steel of the 
frizzen too smooth or too dirty, or the touch hole blocked by the 
residue of previous firings, the flintlock would misfire. Constant 
attention by the soldier to the condition of his lock was the only way 
to insure that it would fire, and even then, misfires were a common 
occurrence.
The percussion ignition system used fulminate of mercury in place 
of flint, steel frizzen, and priming powder. A small amount of this
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very volatile explosive was sealed inside a copper cap which looked very 
much like a small top hat. To prime the lock, the percussion cap was 
pressed onto the end of a tube which projected from the barrel of the 
weapon and led to the main powder charge inside. As the hammer of the 
lock fell forward, it would strike the cap, compressing the fulminate of 
mercury inside against the tube, causing it to explode. The resulting 
fire would travel down the tube to ignite the main powder charge in the 
barrel.
The major advantage of the percussion system was that it was far 
more reliable than the flintlock. Percussion caps were weatherproof and 
the only other factor to be considered in the operation of the 
percussion lock was the fall of the hammer. In tests done by the 
British Army at Woolwich Arsenal in 1834, 6,000 rounds were fired by the 
percussion system with only 36 misfires. In the same test, the 
flintlock system produced nearly 1,000 misfires in 6,000 tries.^
Even though the reliability of the infantry musket was increased 
by the adoption of the percussion system, there was no need for changing 
infantry tactics. To be sure, fewer misfires with the percussion system 
meant a slight increase in the amount of firepower an infantry unit 
could produce, but that increase was not significant enough to warrant a 
greater reliability on firepower. The introduction of the percussion 
system did not increase the range of the musket nor did it increase its 
accuracy, and these were the characteristics of the weapon that 
determined the tactics. By the early 1850s, however, most of the major
2r.E.C. "Modern Tactics." Southern Literary Messenger 26 (January 
1858): 5; David F. Butler, United States Fire Arms, The First Century, 
1776-1875. (New York: Winchester Press, 1971), 82. Butler notes that 
the British still did not adopt the percussion system until 1848.
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European powers were very close to satisfactorily solving these 
problems.
It had long been recognized that the effective use of rifling made 
a firearm inherently more accurate and gave it considerably greater 
range. But in order to effectively use rifling, the projectile had to 
fit tightly enough into the barrel that it would be in contact with and 
fill the grooves of the rifling. As has already been pointed out, this 
meant a patched ball and a toilsome loading process that took from one 
to two minutes. The longer loading time made rifled weapons 
unacceptable for the infantry of the line which relied upon an ability 
to load and fire rapidly to produce ample firepower.3 Throughout the 
1830s and the 1840s, numerous innovations which permitted the effective 
use of rifling in the infantry musket without increasing loading time 
were proposed and tested by the European armies. The result of these 
experiments was a number of different types of rifled small arms which 
were more or less effective in improving the range and accuracy of the 
infantry musket.
In 1853, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis directed that the U.S. 
Army Ordnance Department undertake experiments on the various European 
systems of rifled small arms to determine their effectiveness and their 
suitability for adoption by the United States Army. The experiments were 
carried out at the Army’s Harper’s Ferry Armory during 1853 and 1854 by 
Colonel Benjamin Huger and Lieutenant J.B. Benton of the Ordnance 
Department with the assistance of the armory's master armorer, James H. 
Burton. Secretary Davis was so impressed by the results of these
^Congress, Senate, Senate Executive Document No. 1, 33rd Cong., 
2nd sess., 1855, 19; R.E.C. 7.
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initial experiments, as well as by reports coming from Europe, that in 
his report to the Congress in December 1854 he stated, "results render 
it almost certain that smoothbored arms will be superseded as a military 
weapon."4
Experiments with rifled firearms continued at the Springfield 
Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts during the spring of 1855 under the 
supervision of Lieutenant Benton with the objective of "applying the 
principles of the rifle, . . .  to all the small arms of our military 
service." As a result of these experiments, the Ordnance Board 
recommended to Secretary Davis on 26 June 1855 the adoption of a series 
of rifled small arms of an entirely new model.^
The system of rifling that was recommended by the Ordnance Board 
for the new arms was based on one developed over a period of years 
separately by Captains Delvigne and Minie of the French Army, although 
Minie, rightly or wrongly, is generally given the greater share of the 
credit.® This system involved the use of a soft lead, cylindro-ogee 
projectile the base of which was hollowed out in the shape of a cone 
into which was inserted an iron cup. As with the standard musket ball, 
this projectile loaded easily into the barrel because its diameter was 
smaller than the calibre of the barrel. On firing, however, the iron 
cup in the base of the projectile was driven further into the cone by
4Senate, 20; War Department, Reports of Experiments with Small 
Arms for the Military Service (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, Public 
Printer, 1856), 5.
5Experiments with Small Arms, 39, 85-86.
®J. Schon, Rifled Infantry Arms, A Brief Description of the Modern 
System of Small Arms as Adopted in the Various European Armies, trans. 
J. Gorgas (Dresden: n.p., 1855; reprint, Yorktown, Va.: William E. 
Meuse, 1965), 208; Senate, 19-20.
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the force of the propellant gas. This caused the lead sides of the 
projectile to expand to the limits of the barrel, creating a gas seal 
and filling the grooves of the rifling. Because of the seal, none of 
the propellant gas could escape as it did with the musket ball, so the 
full force of the gas was made to act upon the projectile, greatly 
increasing muzzle velocity and, consequently, range. Additionally, with 
the projectile filling the rifle grooves in the barrel, a spin was 
imparted to it causing it to travel in a true direction once it left the 
barrel. This new type of expanding projectile would come to be known in 
the United States as the Minie ball.
The experiments conducted by the Ordnance Department between 1853 
and 1855 had considered and tested every component of a rifled firearm. 
The tests determined the proper calibre, the ideal length of the barrel, 
the optimum number, depth, and twist of the rifle grooves, the best 
shape, size, and weight for the projectile, and the proper charge of 
powder. During the experiments, master armorer Burton discovered that 
the iron cup used by the French was dangerous as it tended to separate 
from the projectile after leaving the barrel and could cause casualties 
among friendly troops if the soldiers attempted to fire over the heads 
of their comrades. He went on to discover that if the cone in the base 
of the projectile was widened making its walls thinner, sufficient 
expansion of the round was achieved without the iron cup. Therefore, 
the iron cup was eliminated.7
The centerpiece of the new series of rifled small arms was the 
Model 1855 Rifled Musket. This weapon was intended to replace the Model
7Experiments with Small Arms, 14-15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
1842 smoothbored musket as the standard arm of the infantry. The Model 
1855 Rifled Musket was smaller than the Model 1842 Musket with a total 
length of 55.85 inches compared to 57.80 inches for the musket, and a 
calibre of .58 inches vice the muskets' calibre of .69 inches. The new 
rifled musket was provided with a triangular socket bayonet identical in 
style but slightly smaller than the one used on the musket, although the 
length of the blade remained the same. A unique feature of the Model 
1855 was that it incorporated a Maynard tape priming lock, a percussion 
system of ignition that used a roll of paper caps rather than the 
standard copper caps, although the copper caps could still be vised.
The real difference between the Model 1855 Rifled Musket and the 
Model 1842 Musket, however, was to tell in its performance. Where the 
maximum range of the musket was only a few hundred yards, the range of 
the new rifled musket was well over 1000 yards; and where the accuracy 
of the musket was less than 200 yards, the accuracy of the rifled musket 
extended to 500 yards, and even then was more limited by the skill of 
the soldier than the capabilities of the weapon.®
Also included in the Model 1855 series of small arms, as 
recommended by the Ordnance Board, were a pistol carbine, a muzzle 
loading pistol with detachable shoulder stock designed for use by the 
cavalry and light artillery, and a musketoon, a carbine length weapon 
intended for engineer troops. Like the rifled musket, these weapons 
were to have Maynard tape priming locks and rifled barrels, and would 
fire the .58 calibre expanding projectile. While the board recommended 
reboring the existing .54 calibre Model 1841 rifles to fire the .58
8Ibid., 102.
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calibre round, it did not recommend the continued production of this 
weapon, submitting that the musketoon would serve adequately in its 
place. With this recommendation, the Colonel of Ordnance, Henry K. 
Craig, could not agree, however. In his endorsement to Secretary Davis 
of the board’s recommendations, Colonel Craig pointed out that the Model 
1841 Rifle needed only to be manufactured with a .58 calibre bore and 
the new lock in order to correspond with the new series of small arms. 
He also pointed out, "For such an arm we have a factory and extensive 
machinery capable of turning out at least 3,000 per annum. 
Consequently, Craig recommended continued production of the rifle with 
the necessary alterations. Secretary Davis accepted most of the board’s 
recommendations and concurred with Craig on the continued production of 
the rifle. Davis, however, did not see a need for both the rifle and 
the musketoon, directing the discontinuance of the musketoon and the 
issuance of the rifle to the engineer troops in place of it. Production 
of the Model 1855 series of small arms began at the Harper's Ferry and 
Springfield Armories in 1857.
In addition to production of the Model 1855 weapons, the War 
Department determined to convert many of its older model muskets to 
rifled muskets. It was a simple matter for even the old smoothbored 
flintlocks to be fitted with new percussion locks and their barrels 
rifled, enabling them to fire expanding balls made for their particular
%.K. Craig to Jefferson Davis, 26 June 1855, quoted in Claude E. 
Fuller, The Rifled Musket (New York: Bonanza Books, 1958), 5. The 
factory that Colonel Craig was referring to was the rifle factory on the 
left bank of the Shenandoah River at Harper's Ferry. Although a part of 
the Harper's Ferry Armory complex, this factory was a different facility 
from the main armory factory located on the right bank of the Potomac 
River.
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calibre. To be sure, these converted smoothbores would not perform 
quite as well as the Model 1855 Rifled Musket, but their performance 
would far outstrip any unconverted smoothbored musket.
It was clearly understood in the early 1850s that the problems of 
range and accuracy in the musket could be overcome by using a weapon 
that loaded through the breech rather than through the muzzle. But, at 
that time, no satisfactory breech-loading military weapon had been 
invented, and many felt that one never would be. Indeed, there was a 
great deal of prejudice among the line officers of the Army against 
breech-loading arms. Still, the Army was willing to test any that might 
be brought forward. In his initial series of tests of expanding 
projectiles in the fall and winter of 1853 to 1854, Colonel Huger tested 
the breech-loading Sharps carbine, invented by Christian Sharps in 1848, 
but for what seem to be a number of valid technical reasons, found it 
unsatisfactory for military use. In August 1854, Congress made a 
special appropriation of funds to enable the Army to purchase and test 
those breech-loaders that the Army considered to be the best available. 
Testing of these arms continued until early 1857 when a special board of 
officers was convened to complete the tests and make a final 
recommendation. In that recommendation, the board found that none of 
the breech-loading weapons tested were suitable for general military 
use. With that recommendation, Chief of Ordnance Craig suspended all 
ongoing testing and for the time being would not consider further 
testing of breech-loading firearms.1®
1®Senate, 19-20; R.E.C., 7; Experiments with Small Arms, 25; Carl 
L. Davis, "Small Arms in the Union Army, 1861-1865" (Ph.D. diss., 
Oklahoma State University, 1971), 138, 140-41.
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Cavalry also benefited from the same advance in technology that 
gave the infantry the rifled musket. The rifled pistol carbine of the 
Model 1855 series of small arms brought the cavalry trooper some 
increase in firepower through greater range and accuracy than he had 
previously known with his smoothbore pistols and carbine. But the Model 
1855 pistol carbine also cut down on the number of firearms that the 
cavalryman would carry. In place of two pistols and a carbine, he was 
now to be issued just two of the Model 1855 pistols with one detachable 
shoulder stock. Attaching the shoulder stock to one of the pistols 
created a weapon that was supposed to replace the smoothbore carbine. 
The United States Army also manufactured at this time a rifled carbine 
which was intended for use by mounted troops. Known as the United 
States Rifled Carbine, Model 1855, it was not developed as part of the 
Model 1855 series of small arms, but in production it was bored at .58 
caliber so that it would fire the same expanding ball as the Model 1855 
rifled musket and rifle. Only about 1000 of these rifled carbines were 
manufactured in 1855 and 1856, probably because they were to be replaced 
by the Model 1855 pistol carbine, the manufacture of which began in 
1856.11
An equally significant technological development for the cavalry 
was the perfection of the percussion revolver by Sam Colt of Hartford, 
Connecticut in the mid-1840s.12 This weapon had a rifled barrel, and 
was capable of firing six rounds before it had to be reloaded, thus, it
•^William B. Edwards, Civil War Guns (Harrisburg, Pa.: The 
Stackpole Co., 1962), 20-21; Butler, 84-85; Claud E. Fuller, The Rifled 
Musket (New York: Bonanza Books, 1958), 8.
12Butler, 201.
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had the potential to replace the saber under some circumstances of 
mounted close combat. Despite the rifling, however, the revolver's 
effective range was very limited, and the fact that it could not be 
readily reloaded under conditions of mounted close combat meant that the 
saber would still be very much be a primary weapon of the cavalry.
The introduction of the pistol carbine, the rifled carbine, and 
the revolver did not effectively increase the overall firepower 
capability of the cavalry in battle. While some increase in range and 
accuracy were to be realized, these weapons were still very difficult, 
if not inpossible, to reload while engaged in mounted combat, and so did 
not give the cavalry the firepower it would need to stand against 
infantry or to assault positions held by infantry through other than the 
shock action of massed columns in a charge.
Artillery also benefited from new technology in the late 1850s. 
In 1857, the United States Army adopted the Model 1857 12-Pounder Gun- 
Howitzer as its standard field piece. This weapon, which would be known 
as the "Napoleon," was developed in France at the direction of Louis 
Napoleon in the early 1850s. Its chief recommendation was that it 
weighed only 1,227 pounds, 530 pounds lighter than the Model 1841 12- 
Pounder Gun which it replaced. This significant reduction in weight so 
increased mobility that it virtually eliminated the distinction between 
light and heavy artillery as the terms were then applied to field 
batteries. Henceforth, the term heavy artillery would only be applied 
to the guns found in a seige train, or those permanently mounted in 
fortifications, while light artillery would generally be applied to all 
of the field batteries that accompanied an army on campaign. The 
Napoleon, however, was still a smoothbored field piece and fired the
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same types of ammunition to the same ranges as earlier guns. 
Consequently, no actual increase in artillery firepower was realized 
through its introduction.
Experiments on applying rifling to the artillery field gun were 
also being carried out in the late 1850s. As with the application of 
rifling to small arms, the artillery experiments revolved around 
achieving an expansion of a portion of the projectile to engage the 
grooves of the rifling in the bore as the gun was fired. Field 
artillery projectiles, however, because of the effects they were 
expected to have on a target upon inpact, were made of hard cast iron. 
This meant that an expansion of the whole base of the round, as was the 
case with the soft lead Minie ball, was quite out of the question. So 
the effect in the field piece was most commonly achieved through an 
expansion of a lead or other soft metal sleeve placed around the 
projectile or through a soft metal ring embedded in it.
The chief benefits of applying rifling to the field piece were the 
same as for small arms, an increase in the range and accuracy of fire 
over what could be achieved with the smoothbored guns, although the 
increase in range would not be nearly so dramatic as realized with the 
rifled musket over the musket. Two other benefits which would result 
from the successful rifling of field guns were a reduction of the amount 
of gun powder it would take to fire a round, while at the same time 
achieving an increase in the weight of metal thrown at each firing. 
Like the smoothbores, the rifled guns would fire three types of 
projectiles, solid shot, shell, and canister. The effective range of 
the solid shot and shell promised to be approximately 2000 yards. The 
shell, which would be an exploding round, was to be fitted with a
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percussion fuse that would set off the main charge as a result of 
impact. The canister round would have basicly the same characteristics 
as the canister round fired from the smoothbores.
The benefits of rifled artillery were all very promising in the 
late 1850s, but would not be realized in the form of workable field 
pieces until after 1860.
The great technological advance of the late 1850s for the 
military, then, was the introduction of the infantry rifled musket. 
This weapon, with its greatly increased range and its huge increase in 
accuracy over the smoothbored musket, was destined to have a profound 
effect on the conduct of battle. When armed with the musket, the 
infantryman was required to act as part of the mass, because, in order 
to be effective, his fire had to be released in mass, in volleys by 
company or battalion. In the same way, the shock action of the infantry 
bayonet was effective only when the soldiers acted in mass, forming 
compact battalion columns to be directed against the enemy line. On the 
battlefield of the 1850s, the individual infantryman was not an entity, 
not a force that needed to be considered or dealt with. The infantry 
was the entity. It was the infantry unit, the company or battalion, 
trained and directed according to the tactics that was the force that 
had to be dealt with. But, with the introduction of the rifled musket, 
all of that changed. The individual infantryman become a force on the 
battlefield, a force that had to be considered and dealt with. Armed 
with the rifled musket, the infantryman could take careful aim and bring 
down his enemy hundreds of yards beyond the effective range of a company
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or battalion of infantry armed with the musket. The soldier armed with 
the rifled musket, then, was more than a soldier with a weapon of 
increased range and accuracy, he was a soldier with a weapon that gave 
him a firepower capability as an individual. The introduction of the 
rifled musket meant a transition from the tactics of shock action to the 
tactics of firepower. The transition began immediately, but its pace 
was painfully slow, and its realities were witnessed on the battlefield 
years before they were understood or compensated for in the tactical 
manuals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4 
TACTICS, 1855-1861
One of the first to understand that the arming of the infantry 
with rifled firearms would, in some way, require a change in tactics was 
the enlightened and forward thinking Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis. 
In the autumn of 1853, as he directed the Ordnance Department to 
undertake experiments with systems of rifling, Davis also directed the 
development of a new manual of tactics for infantry when armed with the 
rifle. He told Congress in his annual report for 1854, that, 
anticipating the almost exclusive use of rifled firearms, a new manual 
of light infantry and rifle tactics was being prepared that would 
introduce to the service such tactical improvements "as the experience 
of other armies has shown to be valuable."1
To write this new manual, the War Department selected Lieutenant 
Colonel William J. Hardee of the cavalry. Born in October 1815 on his 
father's Georgia plantation, Hardee graduated from the Military Academy 
at West Point in 1838, 26th in a class of 45. His initial active duty 
involved participation in the Second Seminole War as a member of the 
Second Dragoons. In 1840, Lieutenant Hardee was selected by Secretary 
of War Joel R. Poinsett to be one of three officers from that regiment 
to study for 12 months at the French Royal Cavalry School at Saumur,
^Congress, Senate, Senate Executive Document No. 1, 33rd Cong., 
2nd sess., 1855, 21.
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thereafter to return to the Second Dragoons and instruct the regiment in 
the latest French cavalry tactics and practices. Returning in 1842, 
Hardee continued his service with the Second Dragoons, now in Louisiana, 
and marched with the regiment to Texas in 1845 as relations between the 
United States and Mexico worsened. During the War with Mexico, Captain 
Hardee saw action with the Second Dragoons at the sieges of Monterrey 
and Vera Cruz, and at the battles of Cerro Gordo, Churubusco, and Molino 
del Rey. On 14 September 1847, he was with the Second as it escorted 
General Winfield Scott on his triumphant entry into Mexico City. For 
his gallant work during this war, Hardee was breveted lieutenant colonel 
by the War Department and presented a handsome sword by the State of 
Georgia. After the war, he remained with the Second Dragoons on 
frontier duty in Texas, but in February 1853 was granted a leave of 
absence to attend his terminally ill wife in St. Augustine, Florida. It 
was after her death that Hardee was instructed to report to the War 
Department in Washington to begin the task of writing a new infantry 
tactical manual.
Hardee's initial undertakings on the new manual carried him in 
December 1853 to the armory at Harper's Ferry where he observed 
firsthand the tests of rifled firearms being conducted by Colonel Huger 
and Lieutenant Benton. Much impressed with what he had seen, Hardee 
repaired to Washington where, throughout the spring of 1854, he 
supervised a board of officers in translating and adapting the French 
manual of light infantry tactics, Ordonnance du Roi sur 1 'Exercice et 
les Manoeuvres des Bataillons de Cesseurs a'Pied. By 28 July, the 
manuscript of the new manual was complete and Hardee submitted it to 
Secretary of War Davis for approval. At the urging of the Adjutant
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General, Davis directed an evaluation of the new tactics be made by a 
board of officers at the Military Academy utilizing the Corps of Cadets 
as a test unit. Hardee went to West Point to lend his expertise, 
advice, and assistance to the board, and at the end of October 1854, 
Secretary Davis himself went there to review the results. Davis was 
most pleased and Hardee spent the winter of 1854 tol855 making final 
preparations for publication of the manual. A contract for printing the 
manual was given to Lippincott, Grambo, and Company of Philadelphia 
during March 1855 and the first copies were distributed in June. The 
title of this new manual was Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the 
Exercise and Manoeuvres of Troops when Acting as Light Infantry or 
Riflemen.2
Like Scott's manual, Hardee's Tactics, as the new manual would be 
commonly called, was a translation of the latest French system adapted 
to the particular needs and circumstances of the United States Army and 
militia. In organization, Hardee's manual was identical to Scott's 
beginning with the School of the Soldier and proceeding through company 
and battalion drill using virtually the same paragraph structure and 
titles as was used in Scott's manual. Throughout the new manual, whole 
paragraphs and even entire sections were practically word for word the 
same as found in Scott's Tactics.
Differences, of course, could be observed. Hardee's manual of 
arms deviated in several respects from Scott's because Scott's manual
^Nathaniel C. Hughes, General William J. Hardee, Old Reliable 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 44-45; Samuel 
Cooper to Jefferson Davis, 28 July 1854, F63-64, R508, M567, Letters 
Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, Record Group 94, Records 
of the Adjutant General's Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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was written for men armed with full length flintlock muskets, while 
Hardee considered that the soldiers would be carrying the much shorter 
percussion rifle. Another change involved the formation in line of 
battle. The line of battle in Hardee's Tactics was of two ranks where 
in Scott's it was of three. This would have been a significant change 
except for the fact that the War Department had in 1835 suspended those 
injunctions of Scott's tactical system which called for the three rank 
line of battle.3
The differences between Scott's and Hardee's tactical systems that 
at least presumed to recognize the greater firepower of infantry 
carrying rifled firearms were two. The first, and most significant, was 
the standard length of step and pace of the marching soldier. With 
Scott, this was called quick time and was a step of 28 inches at a pace 
of 110 steps per minute. Scott provided for swifter movement by making 
provisions for a double quick time pace measured at 140 steps per minute 
and an even swifter pace he called, "the run." But Scott believed that,
as ranks of men cannot march any length of time at so swift 
a rate, without breaking or confusion, this measure of 
acceleration will not be considered as a prescribed 
exercise, except in turning, forming line by successive 
files, and at the close of a charge. Accordingly, companies 
or battalions will only be habitually exercised in the quick 
time of one hundred and ten steps in a minute.4
In his system of tactics, Hardee kept the quick time cadence of 
Scott's manual, but reserved it for general uses such as the training of 
recruits and new units, extended marches at the route step, and for all 
exercises when the unit was part of a brigade or larger formation. As
^Scott, Infantry Tactics, 1:5.
4Ibid., 1:82, 132, 2:189.
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the habitual pace for battle, Hardee introduced the double quick time 
pace of 33 inch steps at the rate of 165 steps per minute. He went on 
to point out,
the double quick step may be executed with different degrees 
of swiftness. Under urgent circumstances the cadence of 
this step may be increased to one hundred and eighty per 
minute. At this rate a distance of four thousand yards 
would be passed over in about twenty-five minutes.^
Hardee also included provisions for the run, a pace he considered 
to be the same as double quick time except that it would be executed at 
a much greater rate of steps per minute. Like Scott, Hardee believed 
that the soldiers could not march for any length of time at the 
increased double quick time rate of 180 steps per minute or the run 
without breaking ranks and causing confusion, so he cautioned against 
the use of those cadences except under the most urgent circumstances.^ 
The increased rate of movement in battle from Scott's to Hardee's 
tactical system cannot be considered insignificant. A unit marching 
precisely at Scott’s quick time pace would cover 85.56 yards in one 
minute. A unit using Hardee's double quick time would cover 151.25 
yards during the same period of time; an increase in distance of 77 
percent. To be sure, this would reduce the amount of time troops might 
be required to spend under fire while maneuvering from one place to 
another on the battlefield, but merely quickening the pace did not 
consider the greater accuracy of fire that would be encountered when 
fighting against infantry armed with rifled muskets.
^william J. Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1855), 1:26, 28, 114-15, 154, 
2:46.
6Ibid., 1:115.
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The second notable difference between Scott and Hardee was found 
in the procedures for the formation of columns. In Scott's Tactics, the 
principal column formations were the column by platoon, the column by 
company, and the column by division. The procedures for forming these 
columns were cumbersome at best, frequently requiring the unit to halt 
and, in some cases, even dress ranks during their execution. In his 
tactical system, Hardee retained these formations as the principal 
columns as well as Scott's procedures for forming them, but made the 
movements somewhat less complicated and more efficient by eliminating 
some of the halts.
With Scott's simplest column formation, the march by the flank, 
Hardee made more significant improvement. In Scott's system, this 
column was formed by having all the soldiers in the line of battle face 
to the right or left before marching off. Marching any distance in this 
narrow and extended column, however, caused considerable spreading out, 
making it unsuitable for all but short movements. Hardee's march by the 
flank, however, was based on the French concept of "comrades in battle," 
a grouping of the four soldiers from two adjacent files in the line of 
battle. To form Hardee's column by the flank, the unit faced to the 
right as in Scott's system, but with the added measure of having the 
soldiers in the even numbered or rear files step up beside the soldiers 
of the odd numbered or forward files. The result was a compact column 
with a front of four soldiers that could be used for movements over long 
distances without becoming spread out.7
7Scott, Infantry Tactics, 1:134; Congress, Senate, Miscellaneous 
Document No. 3, 36th Cong., 2nd sess., 1860, 152; Hardee, 1:6, 118-19.
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Additionally, from this column by the flank, the line of battle 
could be quickly reformed to the left by simply reversing the procedure 
with the odd numbered file soldiers stepping back into their proper 
place as the facing movement was executed.® Procedures were also 
included so that the line of battle could be reformed to the front of 
the column or to its right with the original order preserved, as well as 
for forming this type of column to the left from the original line of 
battle.
There was no indication in the manual that Hardee intended his 
column by the flank to become the standard marching column, but those 
who used Hardee's system would come to recognize that for marching a 
unit from one place to another, in battle or otherwise, this column 
offered advantages of simplicity, speed, and flexibility that no other 
column formation did. This column, however, would not in any respect 
suffice as a column of assault. Its front was much too narrow, its 
length much too extended, and the officers and non-commissioned officers 
were not positioned so as to properly direct their men in an assault. 
For this reason, if for no other, the column by company and the column 
by division remained the columns that would be required for the conduct 
of battle. In his closing remarks on instructing a regiment in the 
School of the Battalion, Hardee recommended that in training, "Great 
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Lastly, in comparing Scott's and Hardee's tactical manuals, it 
must be pointed out that Hardee did not include a system of tactics for 
units larger than the battalion. Scott's Tactics was written in three 
volumes, the final volume, Evolutions of the Line, being devoted to the 
tactics of brigade and larger units. Hardee's Tactics, however, had no 
corresponding third volume. When tactics for brigade or larger units 
were called for, Hardee referred the user to Scott's manual: "When a 
battalion, instructed in this drill, shall be required to manoeuvre in 
the evolutions of the line, its movements will be regulated by the 
instructions contained in the third volume of the Tactics for heavy 
Infantry, approved by the War Department, April 10th, 1835.
The reason for the lack of a third volume may well have been 
simply that the French manual from which Hardee was working did not 
include tactics for units larger than the battalion. But, apparently, 
neither the War Department nor Hardee considered that the introduction 
of the rifled musket would require any change in the manner in which 
upper echelon units were deployed or used in battle.
Hardee's Tactics was written as a direct result of the pending 
introduction of rifled firearms to the infantry of the line. Yet, 
despite the fact that Davis anticipated the almost exclusive use of 
these rifled firearms by the army and the militia of the United States, 
and that he told Congress the new manual would incorporate the latest 
tactical improvements shown necessary by the experience of other 
nations, Hardee's Tactics was, in reality, little different from 
Scott's. Moreover, considering that the problem to be overcome by the
10Ibid,. 2:224.
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introduction of rifled firearms to the infantry was one of increased 
range and accuracy, the new manual did very little to change the system 
of infantry tactics introduced by Scott, and nothing to change the 
doctrine according to which battles would be conducted. Still, Davis 
considered the introduction of Hardee's Tactics to be one of the 
accomplishments of his term of office as Secretary of War, at least co­
equal with the introduction of the rifled musket.11
Considering the often embedded, if not actually backward attitude 
of many senior officers of this period, it is not surprising that the 
publication of Hardee's Tactics initially created more problems within 
the military establishment than it solved. To begin with, there were 
questions about the manual of arms. In January 1855, a full five months 
before the final publication of Hardee’s manual, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, 
Brevet Brigadier General and Colonel of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Regiment 
at Carlisle Barracks, wrote the Adjutant General of the Army, Colonel 
Samuel Cooper, concerning the need for a revised manual of arms to be 
used with the new rifle. Not content to await even an acknowledgement 
of his letter by Cooper, Hitchcock on 14 January 1855 appointed a board 
of officers from his own regiment to decide upon a system "for local use 
until otherwise directed." The board reported back to Hitchcock in mid- 
February that the best course of action was to adopt, as a "basis of
11Senate, Exec. Doc. No. 1, 17, 19, 21; Jefferson Davis, Jefferson 
Davis, Constitutionalist, His Letters, Papers, and Speeches, 10 vols., 
ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History, 1923), l:xxvi.
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elementary instruction," the manual for rifles contained in General 
Orders Number 38 of 19 August 1846.^
On 2 April, Hitchcock again wrote the Adjutant General to air his 
opinions, which this time were directed toward the manual of arms to be 
included in Hardee's Tactics. His concerns specifically addressed the 
method of fixing and unfixing the bayonet, the possibility of breaking 
the rear sight as the soldier proceeded through the motions of the 
manual, whether or not the weapon would be stacked or grounded during an 
inspection of knapsacks, and the need for special directions in loading 
with the new Minie Ball cartridge. But more generally, Hitchcock's 
concern was that the manual of arms must be written specifically for the 
new rifle and tested with that weapon in hand.13
The Adjutant General referred Hitchcock's April letter directly to 
Hardee, then in Philadelphia working with the publisher on the final 
version of the new manual. Responding to both the Adjutant General and 
to Colonel Hitchcock directly, Hardee addressed each of Hitchcock's 
concerns individually and then assured his addressees that both he and 
the West Point Board which examined his manual had carefully considered 
and tested each motion in the manual of arms against what they believed 
would be the final configuration of the new rifle. In closing, Hardee
l^Ethan Allen Hitchcock to Samuel Cooper, 12 and 14 January 1855, 
F26-28, R517, M567, Record Group 94; Headerquaters, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pa., Orders No. 98, 14 January 1855, F159-60, R517, M567, Record Group 
94. It is most curious that Colonel Hitchcock was concerned about the 
manual of arms for "the new rifle" at this date since no Model 1855 
rifled muskets or rifles had yet been produced, except for possibly a 
few prototype pieces for use by the Ordnance Department in testing. As 
has already been pointed out, the Ordnance Board did not submit the new 
weapons for the approval of the Secretary of War until June 1855.
^Hitchcock to Cooper, 2 April 1855, F420-22, R517, M567, Record 
Group 94.
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aggressively defended his work pointing out that the manual of arms 
"gave me great labor, greater labor, perhaps, than the balance of the 
book all put together, and I do not wish it supposed that my time and 
labor have been so uselessly spent, as in making a system which is 
inapplicable to the new rifle, for which, & for which alone, it was 
intended.n14
Apparently, concerns with the manual of arms in Hardee's Tactics 
not being applicable to arms other than the new rifle continued for seme 
time, and may never have been completely laid aside. Testifying before 
a Congressional committee sent to examine the course of instruction at 
the Military Academy in 1860, Superintendent Hardee admitted that while 
the cadets were trained in infantry tactics according to his system, 
they used a different manual of arms because they were not armed with 
the rifle for which the manual had been written. They were in fact 
armed with a slightly smaller version of the full sized rifled musket 
called a cadet rifled musket. Hardee further acknowledged that he 
believed a new manual of arms was needed for use with the rifled musket, 
and that, "A single manual cannot be devised that is suitable for all
arms."1^
Another, and perhaps more serious, concern for the hierarchy of 
the Army, was the question of which troops would train using Hardee's 
Tactics and which would train according to Scott's. It was clear from 
Davis's statements to Congress that his intent was to have Hardee 
produce a revised tactical system that would, in effect, be used by all
■^Hardee to Cooper, 11 April 1855, F412-18, R517, M567, Record 
Group 94.
^senate, Misc. Doc. No. 3, 94.
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of the infantry forces of the United States. In his report as Secretary 
of War for the year 1854, Davis pointed out, "with the recent 
improvements in small arms, it is probable that the distinction in the 
armament of heavy and light infantry, and rifleman, will nearly cease, 
especially in our service, where the whole force is liable to be 
employed as light troops.
Davis went on to point out to Congress that in setting Lieutenant 
Colonel Hardee to work on a new system of light infantry tactics, he 
(Davis) was anticipating the exclusive use of rifled firearms by the 
infantry of the regular army, and that such a system of instruction was 
the best for the militia also. To set the stage, Davis recommended that 
henceforth all foot troops be designated as infantry regardless of how 
they were armed, rather than the existing practice of calling them 
infantry, light infantry, or rifle regiments according to their armament 
and purpose.
But Davis's intent was not understood by a military establishment 
which was wed to a system that drew a clear and absolute distinction 
between heavy and light infantry, and which saw riflemen as special 
troops of limited use in the winning of battles. Consequently, officers 
began to debate the intention of the War Department, and argue among 
themselves concerning which regiments and companies should train with 
Hardee's manual and which with Scott's. Perhaps Davis by his own hand 
was the perpetrater of the problem for his endorsement of Hardee's 
manual specified that it was "adopted for the instruction of the troops
•^Davis, 2:407.
17Ibid.
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when acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen, and, . . . for the observance 
of the Militia when so employed," implying that the distinction between 
heavy and light infantry, and riflemen was to remain. The same tone was 
present in Davis' forwarding of copies of Hardee's Tactics to the 
governors of the individual states and territories. He told them that 
Hardee's manual was a "system of tactics recently adopted for Light 
Infantry and Riflemen," and left it to their discretion as to how the 
manual would be distributed and used by their militia.1®
In the regular army, matters were finally brought to a head in 
September 1856 when Lieutenant Colonel C.H. Waite, commanding the 5th 
U.S. Infantry Regiment at Ringgold Barracks, Texas, wrote the adjutant 
of the Department of Texas requesting to be told if all infantry 
regiments were to be drilled according to Hardee's Tactics. Waite 
wrote,
Several officers hold the opinion that it is the intention 
of those in authority, to have only those Regiments of 
Infantry which are armed with the Minie Rifle instructed in 
the Light Infantry and Rifle tactics recently prepared by 
Col. Hardee. The manual does not appear to be in every 
respect adapted to the musket.1®
Waite's letter was forwarded by the officer commanding the 
Department of Texas to the Headquarters of the Army in Washington, where 
it was referred to several ranking officers including Adjutant General 
Cooper and General-in-Chief Winfield Scott. Cooper offered the opinion
■^Hardee, 1:4; Jefferson Davis to State and Territorial Governors, 
24 December 1855, F298-99, R37, M6, Letters Sent by the Secretary of War 
Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Records of 
the Office of the Secretary of War, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
19C.H. Waite to D.C. Buell, 4 September 1856, F509, R552, M567, 
Record Group 94.
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that because the infantry regiments serving on the frontier against the 
indians were acting in the capacity of light infantry, they should be 
using Hardee's system. But Cooper was also of the opinion that Davis's 
endorsement of the manual was sufficient guidance for the officers 
commanding troops in the field and that no additional clarification was 
required. General-in-Chief Scott, who was not by any means on good 
terms with Secretary Davis and was probably unhappy that there was a 
system of tactics other than his own, refused comment and merely had the 
letter forwarded. Eventually, it was referred directly to Davis who on 
3 November 1856 penned a confusing note which read, "'Rifle and Light 
Infantry Tactics' as circumstances will permit to this end they will be 
habitually exercised according to this system." Davis's note must have 
been accompanied by clearer instructions to the Adjutant General for on 
28 February 1857 the matter of which regiments would drill according to 
Hardee's Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics was finally resolved with the 
publication of General Orders Number 2. This directive read: "The 
regiments serving on foot, being usually employed as light troops, will 
be habitually exercised in the system of tactics for light infantry and 
riflemen adopted by the War Department, March 29, 1855."20
With the publication of this order, Davis achieved the goal that he 
had envisioned three years earlier when he accepted the position of 
Secretary of War. Henceforth, all infantry regiments of the U.S. Army, 
no matter how they were armed or how they were being employed, would be
^Record Entries and Notes, F507-9, R552, M567, Record Group 94; 
War Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders No. 2, 28 
February 1857, F808, R7, M1094, General Orders and Circulars of the War 
Department and Headquarters of the Army, 1809-1860, Record Group 94.
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drilled according to a tactical system that was supposed to be the 
latest and best available.
Another important question, and a very logical one considering that 
all of the infantry of the regular army was to be trained using Hardee's 
Tactics, was whether or not Hardee's Tactics should supersede the first 
two volumes of Scott's. A recommendation to do just that was made by 
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Silas Casey in a letter to Secretary Davis in 
October 1854. Casey had been a member of the board of officers which 
assembled at West Point in the late summer of 1854 to test Hardee's 
Tactics using the Corps of Cadets. In his letter, Casey told Davis that 
he had a few thoughts on Hardee's Tactics which could not be properly 
included in the final report submitted by the board. Casey praised 
Scott's Tactics as an excellent system for heavy infantry and one which 
had stood the test of time. But he also pointed out that Hardee's 
system contained all of the principles found in the first two volumes of 
the heavy infantry drill, and that a unit trained according to Hardee's 
system could perform all of the movements required by Scott's third 
volume, Evolutions of the Line, and thus could participate in battle 
with units trained totally according to Scott's system.21
Given this, Casey saw four reasons why Hardee's Tactics should 
replace Scott's. First, Scott's Tactics was written for a line of 
battle of three ranks, and even though the three rank formation had 
never been officially adopted or used, Casey saw no need for the 
continuation of a system of tactics that called for it. Secondly, the 
manual of arms in Scott's Tactics was written for the flintlock musket
21silas Casey to Davis, 28 October 1854, F120-25, R495, M567, 
Record Group 94.
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which was no longer in use, and thirdly, some of the movements in 
Scott's had long since been found to be deficient and required 
correction. Lastly, Casey believed that there was some efficiency of 
movement in Hardee's Tactics which would be of benefit to the service.22 
The details as to why Davis did not accept Casey's recommendation 
outright are not apparent from Davis's correspondence. But whatever his 
thoughts were on replacing Scott's Tactics with Hardee's, this action 
was in fact not taken by Davis, the War Department, or the army upon the 
publication of the new manual. Scott's Tactics remained the official 
infantry tactical manual of the Army, even though after 28 February 1857 
it was not being used by the regular army infantry regiments.
Perhaps one reason for not superseding Scott's manual immediately 
was the feud then ongoing between Davis and Scott concerning the 
authority of the Secretary of War over the General-in-Chief of the Army. 
Davis' issuing of a directive suspending Scott's Tactics would have 
meant adding more fuel to an already very large f i r e . 23 it is not 
likely, however, that the fiery and combative Davis would have shrunk 
from taking an action he thought in the best interest of the service 
merely because it would have meant another confrontation with Scott.
A more plausible reason for not superseding Scott's Tactics was the 
fact that this manual and its system of tactics had been enforce within 
the army and the militia since 1835, and an entire generation of 
infantry officers and soldiers had known no drill other than Scott's. 
For a variety of reasons, such established precepts were not all that
22Ibid.
2^Charles Winslow Elliott, Winfield Scott, The Soldier and the Man 
(New York: The Macmilliam Co., 1937), 647-60.
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readily changed in the national military establishment of the 1850s, as 
has been demonstrated here by the controversy on the manual of arms and 
the debate over which units should use Hardee's manual. Resistance to 
change was to be anticipated and practically dealt with. Hardee himself 
realized this and urged the War Department to prepare to deal with it. 
In June 1855, as the first copies of his manual were being released by 
the publisher, Hardee wrote Adjutant General Cooper recommending that 
the report of the board of officers who had examined the new manual be 
published in an order for the benefit of those who would have to use it. 
Hardee suggested that "it would be satisfactory to the army to be 
advised that the drill was thoroughly examined in all its details, and 
practically tested, before it was adopted by the department." This 
knowledge, Hardee thought, together with an admission that the manual 
was mostly a translation from the French, would "render the book more 
generally acceptable."24
Hardee's concerns about the acceptability of the manual were not to 
be taken lightly. Four years after the introduction of his manual, 
Hardee still found it necessary to deal with those who were opposed to 
its use. To a militia officer in 1859, he offered advice concerning the 
introduction of the new system and, in doing so, admitted there was not 
much difference between his manual and Scott's. Hardee wrote,
I think under the circumstances, you have acted wisely in 
not attempting to force the new tactics on the Militia. It 
is with many of them as with many old officers in our 
services. They don't wish after learning one system to be 
compelled to learn another. In time they will be brought to 
see the advantages of the new drill and will also discover
24Hardee to Cooper, 23 June 1855, F774-76, R517, M567, Record 
Group 94.
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that after all there is not much new to learn & that it is 
easy to pass from one system to the other.25
While much attention was given by the War Department and others to 
providing the infantry a new system of light infantry and rifle tactics 
to help deal with the introduction of the rifled musket, no attention at 
all was given to the tactics of the cavalry or artillery which would 
also be fighting against infantry armed with the new weapon.
At the same time that Hardee was preparing the new light infantry 
tactical manual, he was also updating the current cavalry tactical 
manual, the Cavalry Tactics of 1841. This update, though, included only 
very minor changes to the first two volumes of the three volume set; 
School of the Trooper, of the Platoon, and of the Squadron, Dismounted, 
and School of the Trooper, of the Platoon, and of the Squadron, Mounted. 
The most significant change that Hardee made was the addition to volume 
two of a supplement titled, "A Manual for Colt's Revolver." The two 
revised volumes were published in June 1855 by Lippincott, Grambo, and 
Company at the same time that that firm was publishing Hardee's Infantry 
Tactics. Hardee, however, was not identified as the author of these 
volumes, probably because the revisions were so minor that it did not 
warrent appending his name to them. The third volume of the Cavalry 
Tactics, Evolutions of a Regiment, was not updated by Hardee and was not 
republished along with the first two volumes.
For the artillery, the basic tactical manual, Instruction for Field 
Artillery, Horse and Foot, remained until 1860 unchanged from its first
25nardee to F. Townsend, 1 December 1859, quoted in Hughes, 46.
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publication in 1845. A new edition of this manual did appear in 1850, 
but it was simply a reprint without revision of any kind. In 1860, a 
new manual, with the slightly shorter title Instruction for Field 
Artillery, was published. This work was a major revision of the manual 
of 1845, which, like its predecessor, was prepared by a board of 
officers, although this time they specified themselves to be a board of 
light artillery officers.
The field artillery manual of 1860 was considerably different, 
especially in its internal organization, from the manual of 1845 It 
contained much new and some updated information, particularly with 
regard to the organizational and technical aspects of field artillery. 
A section on "Organization, Material, and Service" was added which 
discussed the purpose of field artillery, the organization of the 
battery for the different requirements of active service, and the 
equipment of the battery to include a survey of projectiles and fuses. 
The actual tactics, the drill for handling a battery in combat, however, 
was entirely unchanged from the manual of 1845. No mention of the 
arming of the infantry with the rifled musket was made, nor was any 
adjustment of the tactics of the field battery made to compensate for 
the greater firepower that artillerymen would henceforth face on the 
battlefield. The board of light artillery officers who composed the 
manual did not consider the matter within the purview of their manual, 
and stated, "The employment of field artillery, according to the various 
conditions of service, is a subject of such extent and importance as
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precludes any attempt to treat of it in this work. "26 its importance 
notwithstanding, no other manual was published during this period which 
attempted to comprehensively treat the employment of field artillery on 
the modern battlefield.
2%ar Department, A Board of Artillery Officers, Instruction for 
Field Artillery (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1861; reprint, 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968), 2.




As Secretary of War between 1853 and 1857, Jefferson Davis was 
dedicated to the modernization of the U.S. Army through the introduction 
of new weapons, equipment, and doctrine of the latest and best available 
from the armies of the major European powers. His introduction of the 
rifled musket and of a new system of infantry tactics to make the most 
of the new weapon's greater capabilities have already been discussed. 
However, considering Davis' penchant for military improvement and the 
considerable advance in infantry firepower that the rifled musket 
represented, it is surprising that no significant official effort was 
made to reevaluate or to revise the existing doctrine of grand tactics, 
the doctrine governing how battles would be fought.
The Regulations for the Army of the United States, which laid out 
the basic operating procedures of the Army in both peace and war, and 
which were approved by Secretary Davis and published in 1857, did 
contain a section which addressed the conduct of battles. In 27 
relatively short paragraphs, covering less than four pages in a book of 
almost 500, this section attempted to outline the basic dispositions and 
rules for the use of troops in battle. For the most part, though, this 
brief treatment of the conduct of battle only reiterated and confirmed 
the doctrinal concepts of grand tactics as espoused by Jomini, Halleck,
109
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and Professor Mahan. It advocated the offensive over the defensive 
battle, and specified, "The attack should be made with a superior force 
on the decisive point of the enemy's position." In that attack, the 
troops were to be drawn up in several lines, and false attacks and 
demonstrations were to be made to conceal the true objective of the main 
assault. Artillery was to be employed in silencing the enemy's 
batteries, and cavalry, drawn up on the wings or behind the center, was 
to be "ready for the pursuit." In the defensive battle, the artillery 
was to concentrate its fire on the advancing enemy columns while the 
infantry could sometimes be formed with advantage "in rear of the ground 
on which we are to fight, and advancing at the moment of action." Most 
importantly, "if the attack of the enemy is repulsed, the offensive must 
at once be taken, to inspire the troops, to disconcert the enemy, and 
often to decide the action." The formation recommended by the 
regulation for this movement was the close column.1
All in all, the Army Regulations of 1857 mentioned nothing 
concerning the increase in infantry firepower resulting from the 
introduction of the rifled musket and did nothing to challenge the 
professional preception that battles would be more a matter of infantry 
shock action than firepower.
All other official publications and reports were also devoid of 
any discussion or indication as to how infantry armed with the new 
rifled muskets would effect the conduct of battle. Chief among the 
publications which might have addressed this issue were the reports of 
three officers who were selected by Davis in April of 1855 to "form a
-'-War Department, Regulations for the Army of the United States, 
1857 (New York: Harper s Brothers, Publishers, 1857), 91.
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commission to visit Europe for the purpose of obtaining useful 
information with regard to the military service in general" and the 
"practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of the various 
kinds of rifled arms, which have been lately introduced in European 
warfare." The officers selected for this commission were Major Richard 
Delafield of the Corps of Engineers, Major Alfred Mordecai of the 
Artillery, and Captain George B. McClellan only recently promoted and 
transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the Cavalry. These officers 
traveled in Europe from April 1855 until April 1856 visiting and 
observing the armies of all the major European powers. Their travels 
included a period of 25 days on the Crimean Peninsula observing the war 
then ongoing between the Russian army and the allied British, French, 
Turk, and Sardinian forces. Upon their return to the United States, 
each of these officers wrote and published for the War Department 
lengthy and detailed reports of what they observed. 2
Although Davis' instructions specifically directed the officers to 
study the employment of rifled firearms, none of the final reports 
included comments relative to the effect of these arms in battle, even 
though they were being readily adopted by the major European armies and 
were used by many of the units in the Crimean fighting. Majors 
Delafield and Mordecai can probably be forgiven for this oversight for 
their reports concentrated almost exclusively on their specialties of 
fortifications and heavy ordnance respectively. But not so with 
McClellan's report which dealt more generally with matters of military 
art and science and included detailed observations on the organization,
^Davis, 2:446; Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan, The Young 
Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 44-46.
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administration, and equipping of the European armies and on their 
tactics. In his report, McClellan carefully documented the increasing 
number of rifled firearms being issued to the troops in Europe. In the 
French army, he noted that although the "smooth bore musket is still in 
general use for the infantry of the line; the light infantry and elite 
corps have rifled arms." Of the Austrian army he wrote that, "Under the 
new system all small arms are rifled." The Sardinian army, he reported, 
was organized so that, "Twenty men in each company of infantry have the 
bersagliere rifle, the rest have the ordinary percussion musket, using 
the Nessler ball," a particular type of expanding round similar to the 
Minie ball. McClellan also was aware of and described in detail the 
Prussian needle gun, a bolt action, breech loading rifled infantry arm 
which could be fired at a rate of up to seven rounds per minute to a 
range of 1000 paces.3
Of the infantry tactical systems of the European armies that he 
reviewed, McClellan seemed most impressed "that the Prussian Infantry 
Tactics, from the school of the recruit to that of the brigade, 
inclusive, form only one small volume of 228 pages." But even though 
the Prussians were arming their infantrymen with the most advanced 
firearm of the day, McClellan unconcernedly reported that their infantry 
firing "is usually by vollies, of one rank at a time; no rank fires 
without the special order of the commander." He also noted, "The 
tactics of the French infantry have not been changed since they were 
adopted in our service." Nowhere in his review of any of the infantry 
tactical systems of the European armies does McClellan mention or
■^Sears, 47; George B. McClellan, The Seat of War in Europe in 1855 
and 1856 (Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1857), 42, 46, 55-56, 59.
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describe adjustments being made to conform tactics or grand tactics with 
the superior capabilities of rifled small arms.4
The section of McClellan's report dealing with his observations of 
the fighting on the Crimean Peninsula was largely an analysis of 
strategy and a discussion of the field fortifications used by both the 
Russians and the allies. Here again, McClellan did not specifically 
note the use or effect of rifled firearms in battle. In his three 
references to the tactical conduct of infantry, his analysis seemed 
predisposed by the doctrine of the day. In the first, reviewing costly 
assaults made by the Russians at Inkermann and Traktir, McClellan 
attributed their failure more to improper formation than to the effects 
of firepower. He wrote, "the Russians moved in two heavy and unwieldy 
masses; this system of tactics, which would on many fields, no doubt, 
carry all before it, . . .  in these cases exposed them to terrible 
losses, and rendered impossible that effective development of numerical 
force and individual exertion which was necessary to carry the day." In 
the second reference, he noted that a French assault on Russian works on 
8 September 1855, failed when the French were "rapidly and hopelessly 
driven out at the point of the bayonet." In the last, the failure of a 
British assault, also on 8 September 1855, was attributed "chiefly to 
that total absence of conduct and skill in the arrangements for the 
assault which left the storming party entirely without support."5
But perhaps McClellan should not be criticized too heavily for not 
noting the "practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of
4McClellan, 42, 55.
5Ibid., 10, 21.
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the various kinds of rifled arms" as Davis requested. McClellan's 
report seemed to be a thorough treatment of his subject and most 
carefully provided the details of arms, equipment, administration, and 
tactics of the infantry and cavalry of the European armies. Surely, 
given his thoroughness and attention to detail, if the Europeans were 
thinking in terms of the affects of rifled firearms on the battlefield 
and were developing new tactical and grand tactical doctrine, McClellan 
would have discovered the fact and included it in his report. The most 
probable explanation for McClellan's failure is that he found no 
evidence of any change in tactical or grand tactical doctrine and so did 
not report any. Nearly the same can be said of McClellan's observations 
of the fighting in the Crimea. He and his fellow officers did not 
arrive on the Crimean Peninsula until 8 October 1855, a full month after 
the fall of Savastopol, which was the last major action of the war. 
Therefore, McClellan did not have the opportunity to witness firsthand 
any real infantry fighting, and most likely relied upon interviews with 
those who had been witnesses in order to make his analysis. Here again, 
it is most probable that the Europeans failed to notice the effects of 
the use of rifled firearms and so they escaped McClellan also.^
Given the documentation that remains with us today, it is 
impossible to tell if Davis was satisfied with the results of his 
efforts as Secretary of War to have the War Department or the Army 
determine the affect that rifled small arms would have on the conduct of 
battle. Certainly, he considered that some change in doctrine might be
^Davis, 2:446; McClellan, 46. It is interesting to note that 
McClellan did not mention in his report the new French light infantry 
manual that was the basis for Hardee's Tactics.
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required and took steps to cause an official determination of what that 
effect might be. But, when all of the official publications of the 
period immediately following the introduction of the rifled musket and 
even those down to the beginning of the Civil War are considered, the 
fact remains that no official publication of the War Department or the 
Army established any change or attempted to deal with any potential 
change to the doctrine of how infantry, cavalry, or artillery would be 
employed on a battlefield where the majority of the infantry would be 
armed with rifles.
In somewhat the same way as McClellan can be excused for his 
oversights, the War Department and the Army perhaps can also not be 
seriously taken to task for failing to comprehend the effects that the 
rifled musket would have on the conduct of battle when the major 
theorists of grand tactics themselves failed to perceive the need for 
any change.
Henry Wagner Halleck had resigned his Army commission in 1854 in 
favor of a career before the California bar, but apparently still 
maintained some interest in military affairs and developments. Although 
he produced no new military works, he did publish a revised edition of 
his Elements of Military Art and Science in 1859 which was word for word 
the same as the original edition published in 1846, except for the 
addition of an appendix of "Critical notes on the Mexican and Crimean 
Wars." This new appendix, though, did not even mention, let alone 
discuss the introduction of the rifled musket or its possible effects on 
the conduct of battle. When it came to considering the tactics and
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experience of the Mexican and Crimean Wars, Halleck saw these as 
ratifying the system of grand tactics outlined in the body of his 
original work, particularly the infantry assault made in column 
formation. He largely dismissed the Mexican War, however, because "the 
small number of troops engaged, and the peculiar character of the ground 
in most cases, afforded but few opportunities for the display of that 
skill in the tactics of battle which has so often determined the victory 
upon the great fields of Europe." Still, Halleck did note that at 
Resaca de la Palma "the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the 
victory" and at the Battle of Contreras "the charge by Riley's columns 
of infantry" was a movement "well planned and admirably executed."7
Of the Crimean War, Halleck concluded that only the Battle of Alma 
was "subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles." Of this 
action Halleck believed, "The heavy column of Bosquet probably decided 
the victory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line." 
He noted also that the English advanced in columns of brigades, their 
left protected "by a line of skirmishers, of cavalry and horse 
artillery." This was a tactical disposition he had advocated in his 
basic treatise on tactics. The other major actions of the Crimean War- 
-Balaklava, Inkerman, and Tchernaya— Halleck saw only as "sorties made 
to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defense, and to prolong 
the operations of the siege.n Of Inkerman and Tchernaya, though, 
Halleck made the same criticism of the Russians as McClellan had; that
7Halleck, 3rd ed., 1862, 1, 414-15.
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their infantry columns were heavy and unwieldy masses which caused them 
large losses and prevented an effective assault.®
Throughout this period, the Baron de Jomini remained Europe's 
preeminent authority on strategy and grand tactics. He continued 
writing, producing new works of military history and military art and 
science. There is no doubt from these writings that Jomini was keenly 
aware of the technological developments which were taking place 
throughout the 1850s, especially the introduction of expanding 
projectiles and rifled small arms for the infantry. But, although 
Jomini was aware of these developments and aware of the questions 
concerning their effect on the conduct of battle, he reasoned that this 
affect would not change the tactical doctrine then being used by the 
armies of Europe and the United States.
Like Halleck, Jomini published new editions of his Summary of the 
Art of War without changing the original text, but adding appendices to 
discuss recent military developments and innovations. One of these 
appendices, written sometime just after the conclusion of the Crimean 
War, specifically addressed the influence which the rifled musket would 
have on the tactics of battle. In it, Jomini asked the question, "Will 
the adoption of the rifled small-arms and inproved balls bring about any 
important changes in the formation for battle and the now recognized 
principles of tactics?"®
Jomini began his analysis of this question by pointing out that 
the potential influence of infantry firepower in battle was not a new
®Ibid., 415-16.
®Jomini, 355.
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question, but one that extended at least to the reign of Frederick the 
Great. Frederick, he pointed out, had fought a few of his battles with 
his troops formed primarily in deployed lines, where the use of their 
firepower played a significant role in the winning of the battle. But 
the armies of the French Revolution, though they had initially imitated 
Frederick by adopting the deployed line as their order of battle, had 
been forced by necessity to the use of columns of attack and infantry 
shock action in winning their battles. The column of attack, no less, 
had been the system of Napoleon, who fought nearly all of his battles on 
the offensive.^
The one recent example of the use of deployed lines, which Jomini 
admitted, was in the tactics of the Duke of Wellington, whose successes 
on the peninsula of Spain and the field of Waterloo "with troops 
deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the 
murderous effect of the infantry-fire." But Jomini did not see the 
linear tactics of Wellington as a definitive statement of the virtues of 
infantry firepower over shock action and berated "the fatal tendency of 
the clearest minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and 
to cast in the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may 
arrange, without taking into consideration" all of the circumstances.11
Jomini had personally discussed the matter with Wellington at the 
Congress of Verona in 1823 and reported that the Duke admitted the 
tactical ascendancy of the English over the French at Waterloo was due 
largely to the French use of excessively heavy columns which were "very
10Ibid., 348-50.
n Ibid., 349-50.
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dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its 
fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry." According to Jomini, 
he modestly pointed out to Wellington that these heavy columns were not 
the small and mobile battalion columns which he (Jomini) advocated. The 
battalion column by division, Joruini told Wellington, was "a formation 
which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep 
masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and 
are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery." Jomini then 
pointed out that this was precisely the formation in which Wellington 
had placed his Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian infantry at Waterloo. 
Wellington replied that this was because he "could not depend upon them 
so well as upon the English." This statement Jomini took to be an 
admission by the Duke that the battalion column formation was superior 
to the deployed line. Wellington replied that the battalion column was 
certainly good, but that rating depended upon the discipline of the 
troops and the circumstances of the battle and ended by saying, "A 
general cannot act in the same manner under all circumstances."I2
Given the discussion with Wellington, Jomini concluded, as he had 
in his original text, that while the line of battle formation could, 
under the proper circumstances, be used effectively on the defense, it 
was entirely unsuitable in the attack. Jomini stated emphatically, 
"That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in 
marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over 
an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
12Ibid., 350-51.
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order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success."13 For 
Jomini, the preferred method of attack was with the assault battalions 
formed in column by division, a formation which emphasized shock action 
over firepower.
Having reviewed and reestablished the primacy of the battalion 
column, and, by implication, shock action in the attack, Jomini returned 
to the question of what affect the new rifled infantry arms would have 
on tactics. He quickly dismissed the notion that because of the 
increased range and accuracy of these weapons, battles would henceforth 
be a matter of two armies standing and firing at each other until one 
side or the other gave way. Battles, he said, would continue to be 
decided through maneuver, and victory "will fall to the general who 
maneuvers most skillfully." And as he had pointed out so many times 
before, maneuver was best accomplished with battalions in the column by 
division formation which necessarily relied on shock action and not 
firepower to achieve results. Although Jomini discussed and admitted 
that the deployed line relying almost exclusively on firepower was an 
option, he dismissed it by saying, "I would never accept the command of 
an army under this condition."^4
He did state, however, that the battalion column should be 
modified somewhat by limiting the company line of battle to two ranks 
and including only six companies in each battalion. A battalion column, 
then, would have a slightly lengthened front with the companies in two 
rather than three ranks, and a depth of just six ranks. Jomini reasoned
13Ibid., 353.
14Ibid., 355-56.
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that battalion columns formed in this manner "would not be so much 
exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the mobility 
necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them upon the 
enemy with great force."15 Nowhere in his discussion did Jomini 
consider or relate the increase in firepower that the rifled musket 
would bring to the battlefield to the use of the battalion column in 
future battles.
In his conclusions, Jomini stated unequivocally, "That the 
improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important change in the 
manner of taking troops into battle."1® He did, however, recommend that 
the number of good riflemen and skirmishers be increased and dispersed 
throughout the line of battle, and that the troops on the whole be 
exercised in firing. His conclusions also reiterated that he believed a 
defense made with battalions in line of battle, relying upon firepower, 
at least initially, would be excellent, but that an attack upon an enemy 
position made in the line of battle formation would be difficult at 
best.
The last of the major theorists, Dennis Hart Mahan, had the least 
to say of the three concerning the effects which rifled firepower in the 
hands of the infantry would have on the conduct of battle. Mahan's 
major published work that despite its title, An Elemental Treatise on 
Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, dealt with 
the conduct of battle, was first published in 1847 and continued in 
print until 1862. But unlike Jomini and Halleck, Mahan never attempted
15Ibid., 356.
16Ibid., 359.
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to revise or update this manual as new technologies emerged. Throughout 
the period between the introduction of the rifled musket and the 
beginning of the Civil War, he continued as the leading lecturer on 
military art and science at the Military Academy at West Point, and no 
doubt was aware of and carefully noted all of the latest military 
developments. But there is no evidence to show that he particularly 
noted the increased firepower potential that the rifled musket 
represented, or that he made any revision to his teachings on grand 
tactics to accommodate the potential of the new weapon. During this 
period, West Point was still largely a school of engineering, and Mahan 
was a professor of engineering before he was a professor of tactics.
If the Army and the established military theorists of the day did 
not recognize the effect that rifled firearms in the hands of the 
infantry would have on the conduct of battle, there were those younger 
students of military art and science who were at least intrigued by the 
new weapon and curious concerning its potential effects on the 
established systems of tactics.
Among the first of these to publish was Captain Henry Heth of the 
10th Infantry. Heth was a West Point graduate, last in the class of 
1847, who had earned his captaincy ahead of his classmates and others 
through long, rigorous, and exemplary service on the frontier.17 His 
interest in the new rifled musket and its potential for firepower,
17Henry Heth, The Memoirs of Henry Heth, ed. James L. Morrison, 
Jr. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), xxvii.
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though, may have been less of an interest in tactics than it was simply 
an interest in firearms and marksmanship.
Heth had earned a reputation on the frontier as a marksman which 
led him to use his own troops to experiment with a system of target 
practice for soldiers that had been devised by Sir Henry Hardinge of the 
British Army. At about the same time, March 1856, General-in-Chief 
Scott issued a circular calling on officers to express their views as to 
the best methods of improving accuracy within the Army. Heth responded 
to the circular by forwarding to Washington a pamphlet he had written 
describing a system of target practice which resulted from his own 
experiments with Hardinge's system. Returning from the West on leave in 
early 1857, Heth stopped by Washington to lobby with newly appointed 
Secretary of War John B. Floyd for the opportunity to formally publish 
the system of target practice for the betterment of the Army. Floyd, 
somewhat of a marksman himself, was impressed enough that, upon the 
completion of Heth's leave in October 1857, he was placed on special 
duty in Washington to do just that. The result was the publication by 
Heth and the War Department in March 1858 of A System of Target Practice 
for the Use of Troops When Armed with the Musket, Rifle-Musket, Rifle, 
or Carbine.
Like most of the works published on military subjects in the 
United States during this period, Heth's A System of Target Practice was 
not entirely his own work. Heth stated it was "prepared principally 
from the French" and he acknowledged using the reports of other officers
1®Ibid., 135,138. Heth was aware of Hardinge's system because 
Heth's friend, Oliver 0. Howard, had sent him a copy of the London 
Illustrated News with a description the system.
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who had responded to the March 1856 circular from the General-in- 
Chief.1® According to Heth, his principal reason for preparing the book 
was:
The inaccuracy of the soldiers of our army in firing has 
been a matter of surprise and regret to many officers. This 
has been especially remarked upon since the introduction of 
the expanding ball into our service.20
Heth's book was exactly what its title indicated, a system of 
target practice for the Army to use in the training of its infantry 
soldiers. It discussed how soldiers should be taught to aim, the proper 
positions for them to take in firing, trigger pull and simulated firing 
exercises, how ranges and targets should be set up, and, of course, how 
to conduct live firing exercises. The book was oriented on the tactics 
of the day in that all of the exercises conformed to the methods of 
firing that would be conducted by an infantry unit on the battlefield, 
that is, fire by volley and file while in ranks, and firing as 
skirmishers. Heth even went so far as to instruct officers in the 
proper delivery of the firing commands cautioning them that being too 
quick between the preparatory command of "aim" and the execution command 
of "fire" would throw off the aim of their soldiers by allowing them too 
little time for aiming properly, while taking too much time between 
these commands would cause the soldiers to lose their aim in the fatigue 
of having to hold their weapons in the firing position for too long.21
1®Henry Heth, A System of Target Practice (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1862), 1, 3.
20Ibid., 9.
21Ibid., 52-54.
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While Heth's system, if adopted and followed by the Army, would 
certainly significantly raise the effectiveness of infantry fire and 
insure fuller development of the firepower capabilities of the rifled 
musket, it contained nothing to change or adapt the precepts of minor or 
grand tactics to the conduct of battle between armies possessing this 
greatly perfected firepower. While Heth apparently recognized and 
desired to see the Army capitalize upon the advantages that would result 
from arming soldiers with a weapon of greatly increased range and 
accuracy, he did not recognize how this weapon would affect the conduct 
of battle. Perhaps his long experience on the frontier did not 
influence his thinking enough. There soldiers habitually fought more as 
skirmishers, and long and accurate fire could decide almost any of the 
engagements with the Indians. Heth's book, however, was written in the 
terms of Scott's and Hardee's tactics, tactics that Heth studied and 
understood, but with which he had no experience in battle. Despite the 
fact that he was writing about marksmanship, Heth still believed that 
much of the effectiveness of infantry fire in battle would depend on the 
soldiers all firing on the given order of command. 22 jn this regard, 
then, A System of Target Practice made only a minor contribution to the 
battle doctrine of the day, because it dealt only with the improved 
capabilities of the rifled musket and did not recognize the tactical 
problems which would be brought about by inproved firepower.
Some of the fresh interest in weapons and tactics caused by the 
introduction of the rifled musket came from the civilian side. In a 
long article titled "Modern Tactics," in the January 1858 issue of The
22Ibid., 53.
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Southern Literary Messenger, an author who identified himself only as 
R . E . C . , 23 expounded upon the changes he believed that the introduction 
of the rifled musket would have on the conduct of war. Although the 
article endeavored to review the entire history of technical 
developments in warfare and, in many cases, was overly opinionated, it 
contained some well researched and knowledgeable insights as to the 
capabilities of the rifled musket and its effect on the conduct of 
battle that were being overlooked in print by other writers.
R.E.C. was most impressed with the capabilities of the new weapon 
and saw it not only as "the best fire-arm that has ever been put into 
the hands of troops" but also as a weapon which "has reached the limit 
of possible improvement in its principal features." Its principal 
features he saw as range, accuracy, and the rapidity with which the 
weapon could be loaded. The range of the rifled musket R.E.C. judged to 
be greater than the human capability of the soldier using the weapon. 
He pointed out that the penetrating power of the rifled musket 
projectile was sufficient to make the weapon lethal at a range of 1500 
yards, even though the soldier was incapable of engaging a target or 
observing the effects of his fire beyond 1000 yards. Therefore, in this 
feature, there was no room for possible improvement. The same was true 
for the accuracy of the weapon. R.E.C. believed that in battle, the 
target of the infantry would not be single soldiers, but groups of 
soldiers. He cited the results of experiments conducted at the 
Springfield armory in 1855 which showed that at a range of 1000 yards,
23pavid K. Jackson, The Contributors and Contributions to the 
Southern Literary Messenger (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Historical 
Publishing Co., 1936), 139. Jackson states the author might have been 
R.E. Cochrane.
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the average deviation of the rifled musket projectile from the vertical 
and horizontal was only 47-1/2 and 29 inches respectively. He concluded 
that this level of accuracy was more than sufficient to enable the 
average infantry formation to be effective to a range of 600 to 800 
yards against another infantry formation or a crew working an artillery 
field piece. With regard to the rapidity of fire, R.E.C. declared that 
the slowest soldier would be able to fire three rounds a minute with the 
rifled musket and the best soldiers five. "Any thing beyond," he said, 
"would be a positive disadvantage; for troops fire too much at all 
times, and what is wanting is, that they should fire more deliberately, 
and not more rapidly."24
R.E.C. was quick to recognize that the introduction of the rifled 
musket would have a profound effect upon how the infantry would be 
required to fight. He pointed out that in the past, tactics had 
substituted "the action of masses in the place of the action of the 
individual soldier." Under such a system, R.E.C. believed, soldiers 
were trained only to the extent that they were capable of acting as part 
of the mass. They were not trained in the use of the musket and bayonet 
as individuals. The future, though, would require soldiers who were 
more capable of independent action, better trained to use both the 
rifled musket and the bayonet. "Above all," he said, "as the whole 
power of infantry is in its fire and the bayonet, let the soldier be 
perfected in the use of both."25
24R.E.C., 9-11.
25Ibid., 12, 18.
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The ideal of this new infantry system, according to R.E.C., was to 
be found in the training and drill of the "Foot Chasseurs" of France. 
Members of these units, he wrote, were required to complete courses in 
gymnastics and fencing with the bayonet to perfect themselves as 
individual soldiers. Their drill much simplified and quickened the 
evolutions required of the company and battalion in battle to an average 
savings of one-third of the time required for the same movements under 
the old system. "What an advantage!" R.E.C. wrote, "For we must 
remember that under such a tremendous fire as that of modern artillery 
and the Minie-rifle, time is life. "2® He went on to point out that just 
such a system as that of the "Foot Chasseurs" had been prepared for the 
use of the United States Army and the militia by Lieutenant Colonel 
Hardee at the direction of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. R.E.C. 
concluded:
The new system is especially suited to the genius of the 
American people. It is in fact the bush-fighting of the 
American rifleman, rendered ten times more effective by the 
regularity of action which discipline produces, by the 
improved weapon and its bayonet, and by the capability of 
the men to perform the battalion evolutions when 
necessary.27
As to the conduct of battle, R.E.C. believed that the use of 
skirmishers would be greater than ever before. In the infantry assault, 
he agreed with Jomini that the day of massive columns was over and that 
future assaults by the infantry would be made using converging small 
columns of single battalions in the column by division formation. The 
cavalry, he wrote, needed to increase the speed of its formations in
26Ibid., 16.
27Ibid., 18.
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order to deliver its powerful shock in a charge against infantry. The 
artillery, in order to maintain its place in the tactics of battle, was 
to replace its six pounder guns with the greater range of the twelve 
pounder field piece. "This would enable field artillery to act from a 
distance, which would render the fire of the Minie rifle much less 
dangerous." And lastly, R.E.C. believed that the use of field 
fortifications on the battlefield would be increased significantly "in 
order to shelter all troops from the tremendous effects of the new arms, 
until the decisive moment of immediate action."28
Overall, R.E.C.'s article was remarkable in many respects for its 
preception of the reality of the rifled musket. With regard to the 
capabilities of the weapon, R.E.C. was correct in most of his 
assertions. It is particularly noteworthy that he recognized that the 
potential of the rifled musket was limited more by the human factor than 
anything else. So too, it is noteworthy that R.E.C. recognized that the 
introduction of the rifled musket would advance the worth of the 
individual soldier in battle, and thus required a greater emphasis on 
training the soldier as an individual. R.E.C.'s ideas on changes in the 
conduct of battle were particularly perceptive concerning the increased 
use of skirmishers, the need to increase the range of artillery, and the 
benefits to be derived from a greater use of field fortifications. But 
throughout the article, R.E.C. displayed the same impediment of 
foresight that inflicted other military thinkers of his time— that 
battles would be won by shock action and not by firepower. He did not 
see a benefit to increasing the soldier's rate of fire, indicating that
28Ibid., 19.
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he was not willing to accept that firepower alone would be the decisive 
element of battle. The same was indicated by his endorsement of 
Hardee's tactics. For R.E.C., Hardee's tactics were a sufficient 
complement to the rifled musket because the new tactics revised the 
skirmish drill and increased the tempo of infantry maneuver to allow 
columns of assault to close with an enemy line armed with the rifled 
musket. As with others, R.E.C. failed to note that Hardee's tactics 
offered no innovations to overcome the problems of increased firepower. 
R.E.C. endorsed the use of small columns for the infantry assault citing 
Jomini's statement "that in his long experience he never saw an attack 
fail which was made in this manner."^9 Clearly, R.E.C. believed that 
despite the introduction of the rifled musket with all of its firepower 
capability, the decisive element of battle would remain the shock action 
that only the infantry was capable of delivering with the bayonet.
Another of the minor theorists of this period was First Lieutenant 
Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox. Wilcox was an 1842 graduate of the United 
States Military Academy who served with distinction as an infantry 
officer in the War with Mexico and continued his military career through 
the 1850s. In 1859, Wilcox published a book called Rifles and Rifle 
Practice. Although largely a technical and mathematical explanation of 
the physical science of rifles and rifle fire, accompanied by a survey 
of the rifled firearms developed by the European powers for their 
infantry, Wilcox's book did contain some observations on the probable 
effects of rifle armed infantry on the conduct of battle. Like Heth, 
Wilcox admitted in the preface of his book that he claimed little of it
29ibid.
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as his original work, the majority being translations from what he 
considered to be the best French publications of the day on the subject 
of military rifles. Wilcox did not further identify the works or the 
authors he translated, so it is impossible to determine which, if any, 
of the tactical observations in Wilcox's book are his own.
Much of what Wilcox had to say about rifles concerned the 
capabilities of the new weapon in the hands of the individual marksman. 
In Chapter Five, however, he turned his attention to the weapon in the 
hands of an infantry unit, "for," he wrote, "it is of higher importance 
to know what effects are produced when it [the rifle] is employed by a 
number of men united in one body."30 Wilcox limited himself to 
investigating the relative effectiveness of the rifled musket when used 
in the standard tactical methods of firing, that is in the company 
volley, the fire by file, and the fire of skirmishers. Wilcox termed 
effectiveness of fire the "efficacy of fire," and defined it as a 
mathematical relationship resulting from the measurement of the 
accuracy, range, penetration, and rapidity of fire as observed during 
the execution of any of the tactical methods of firing. More simply 
stated, Wilcox was interested in measuring the casualty producing 
capability of a body of infantry using the various different infantry 
firearms, at various ranges, given the three different methods of firing 
tactically.
Using data from experiments made at Vincennes, France in 1851, 
Wilcox stated that at ranges under 164 yards the rifle had little, if 
any, superiority over the musket, at 218 yards the rifle was one and a
30cadmus M. Wilcox, Rifles and Rifle Practice (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1859), 167.
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half times as effective as the musket, and at 437 yards it was six times 
as effective. Beyond 437 yards, Wilcox continued, the musket was 
completely ineffective while the rifled musket could still be 
considerably effective. Of the different methods of firing, Wilcox 
concluded, "These experiments proved that the fire of skirmishers was 
more effective than that of the file, and that the latter was more so 
than that of company." The exact ratio of effectiveness among the three 
methods Wilcox gave as 2 : 3 : 4. That is, two soldiers firing as 
skirmishers were as effective as three soldiers firing by file and four 
soldiers firing in a company volley. The reason, according to Wilcox, 
was that the soldiers firing as skirmishers were more deliberate in 
aiming and firing being less distracted than their comrades in the close 
order formation by the activity of others, and, in the case of the 
company volley, the necessity of firing precisely on the order of an
officer.31
In a later chapter of his book, Wilcox turned his attention from 
the capabilities of the rifled musket to a consideration of the effects 
that the weapon would have on the conduct of battle. In this chapter, 
many of Wilcox's observations were farseeing and correctly predicted the 
influence that greater infantry firepower would have on the future 
battlefield. Summing up his ideas Wilcox wrote:
Fields of battle will be more extended than formerly; 
there will be more difficulty in estimating the variety and 
number of the adversary; more difficulty in properly placing 
troops on the field, and directing their movements. Keeping 
them together, holding them well in hand so as mutually to 
protect and sustain each other, will, in future, require the 
greatest care. As fields of battle will cover more ground
31Ibid., 173-74.
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than formerly, new tactical means to obviate the 
disadvantages resulting from this will be required; that 
continuity of lines required by tactics will no longer be
necessary.32
Wilcox's greatest concerns about battle in the future seem to have 
resulted from the great range at which the rifled musket could be 
effective. He saw infantry rifled musket fire as being destructive at 
1200 yards and absolutely irresistible at 600 yards. The infantry line 
with the smoothbored musket had not been effective beyond 300 yards. 
For Wilcox, this meant that the greatest care must be taken when 
bringing troops into battle. He feared that if care were not exercised, 
whole armies would suddenly find themselves under the most destructive 
fire. This concern particularly applied to the positioning of units 
which were not immediately to engage the enemy, such as the units of the 
main assault force or the main defensive line, and the reserve units. 
Ever so slightly, Wilcox hinted that a new concept of the order of 
battle might be required when he said, "The distances between lines in 
battle are fixed by tactics, and much importance seems to be attached to 
this feature: this will probably give way to a different o r d e r . "33
Turning his attention to infantry units in particular, Wilcox 
predicted that the importance of the individual infantry battalion on 
the battlefield would be much increased and the latitude given to 
battalion commanders to take independent action would have to be much 
broadened. This would mean that the organization of the infantry 
battalion and the precepts of infantry tactics would have to be changed 
to permit greater and more rapid mobility, particularly in deploying and
32ibid., 242.
33ibid., 242-43.
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in the development of fire power. Toward this end, Wilcox's 
recommendations were the same as had been made by Jomini before him; 
that henceforth, the infantry line of battle formation should be in two 
ranks, and that the battalion should be composed of just six companies 
of 100 men each. Also like Jomini, Wilcox was not quite ready to 
believe that battles would be fought and won through the use of fire 
alone. Therefore, he recommended that the habitual formation of the 
infantry battalion on the battlefield should be the column by division. 
With only six companies to a battalion, this formation would not offer 
as lucrative a target as a battalion of ten companies, would be more 
readily deployable into the line of battle formation for firing, and 
would still be capable of forming a strong square to resist the assault 
of cavalry. Should a column formation of greater depth be required, 
Wilcox suggested that one battalion be placed behind another.34
Wilcox went on to recommend that a regiment of infantry should 
consist of four of these six company battalions and that each company 
should be thoroughly instructed in both target practice and skirmish 
drill. The best marksmen in the regiment, he believed, should be 
assigned to the fourth battalion. But this battalion should not be 
limited to skirmish duty alone, "but to be organized at times into 
special corps, to be launched at critical periods of battle in mass, 
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Turning to the cavalry, Wilcox pointed out that even when the 
infantry was armed with the smoothbore musket, a cavalry charge against 
it stood little chance of success unless the infantry were demoralized 
or poorly handled. Against infantry armed with the rifled musket, a 
cavalry charge "will be made with more danger and loss to itself, and 
with less probabilities of success." As before, Wilcox saw the problem 
as the extended range at which infantry fire would become destructive. 
Formerly, the cavalry could approach to within 400 yards of the infantry 
to begin a charge without suffering loss. Now, at 1200 yards the 
cavalry would be within the destructive range of the infantry, and the 
probability of loss would increase as the cavalry formation drew closer 
to the infantry line and the range grew shorter. But, Wilcox could not 
completely dismiss from the battlefield the cavalry and its powerful 
capability for shock action stating, "Cavalry, in the hands of a 
skillful general, must ever be a formidable arm. "3®
Wilcox's comments concerning artillery on the rifled musket 
battlefield were perhaps the most perceptive of all. He noted that the 
destructive range of the infantry line was now at least equal to, in 
most cases superior to, the range of the most destructive fire that a 
battery of artillery could deliver against an infantry formation. 
Experiments at Hythe, England in 1856 showed that an infantry line of 
only 30 files, less than half a company, could disable a battery at a 
range of 810 yards in only three minutes. Therefore, Wilcox thought, 
artillery would no longer be able to open battles or prepare the way for 
the main assault by going forward to establish a firing position in
36Ibid., 246-47.
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close range of the enemy infantry line. "It is clear," Wilcox wrote, 
"that field artillery, with its present range, cannot with any chance of 
success remain in action in front of infantry." Nor did Wilcox believe 
that extending the range of artillery, even to several miles, would 
restore its former position on the battlefield because, "The infantry 
rifle has now a range equal, or greater, than the limit of distinct 
vision, and greater even than the extent offered by fields of battle in 
general." Still, he ended his statement on artillery optimistically by 
saying, "in its legitimate sphere of action in removing obstacles, in 
the attack and defense of forts and fortresses, artillery remains 
intact, as well as in the grand tactics of battles.”37
With regard to field fortifications, Wilcox saw the introduction 
of the rifled musket as overcoming the problems that had been 
experienced when they were used in conjunction with the smoothbore 
musket. "With the improved rifle," he wrote, "the principle of the 
works will not be changed, but the inconveniences may be diminished."38 
Those inconveniences were the areas in front of field works which could 
not be adequately covered given the limited effective range of the 
smoothbore musket. The introduction of the rifled musket, therefore, 
would serve to strengthen the use of field fortifications.
In Rifles and Rifle Practice, Wilcox's assessment of the power of 
the rifled musket was more penetrating than that of any other writer of 
the period. He decidedly demonstrated that the most effective fire 
would come from infantry in open order, skirmishers, and not from
37Ibid., 247-48.
38Ibid., 249.
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infantry in the standard close order line of battle. His ideas 
concerning the conduct of battle correctly predicted the expanded 
breadth of the battlefield, as well as the more important and 
independent role that would be played by the infantry battalion and its 
commander. And Wilcox's ideas on the use of artillery predict the much 
changed capability for engagement that that arm would face on the rifled 
musket battlefield. But in all of this, Wilcox offered no practical 
suggestions as to how minor or grand tactical doctrine should be 
changed. Other than establishing that skirmishers were more effective 
in their firing than soldiers in the close order formations, Wilcox did 
not elaborate or attempt to suggest new tactical procedures which would 
capitalize on the greater firepower of infantry armed with the new 
rifled musket. His prediction of the extended battlefield and the more 
important and independent role of infantry battalions did not cause him 
to suggest or introduce any new concepts for the order of battle or the 
sequences of engagement, or to depart from the traditional infantry 
formations in battle. And lastly, even though Wilcox predicted 
significant changes in the battlefield capabilities of the infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery because of increased firepower, he could not set 
aside the time honored concept that shock action and not firepower would 
win battles.
Another West Point graduate who published at least some of his 
thoughts on the implications of the introduction of the rifled musket 
for the future conduct of battle was First Lieutenant John Gibbon. 
Gibbon shared with Heth membership in the class of 1847, and he had seen 
active service in Mexico during the final stages of Scott's campaign 
against Mexico City and in campaigns against the Seminole Indians in
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Florida. Between 1855 and 1860, he was assigned as an artillery and 
quartermaster instructor at the Military Academy. Toward the close of 
this assignment, Gibbon published The Artillerist's Manual, which he had 
originally prepared as a book of instruction for cadets, but which he 
decided to extend "beyond the limits at first proposed, with a view of 
spreading information not popularly accessible, upon a subject of the 
first importance to our national defense."39
Gibbon's objective, as the title of the manual implies, was a book 
for the instruction and reference of artillery officers, especially 
those artillery officers who would man the large coastal fortifications 
during war. Gibbon believed these fortifications to be the nation's 
principle defense against invasion.40 For its time, Gibbon's manual was 
remarkably comprehensive in its instruction and scope of subject matter, 
covering almost all aspects of the study of artillery including the 
theory and science of its firing, types of guns, projectiles, carriages, 
and related equipment, the problems of logistics, and even the selection 
and care of horses. Sections were also included on the function, 
maneuver, and tactics of field artillery which offered Gibbon the 
opportunity to comment on the effects that the rifled musket would have 
on field artillery as well as on the general conduct of battle.
At the first of these opportunities, Gibbon addressed directly the 
subject of the rifled musket and field artillery, and took bold 
exception to the assertions of Wilcox and others "that the use of the
39john Gibbon, The Artillerist's Manual (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand, 1860; reprint, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 
5.
40Ibid.
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rifle will supersede entirely the use of field-pieces in war." Gibbon 
pointed out that because of the small signature effect of the strike of 
a single bullet, the rifleman during the confusion of battle would be 
entirely unable to adjust the sights of his weapon so as to be able to 
effectively fire at targets at the extended range of the rifle. 
Artillerymen, on the other hand, could easily follow and observe the 
strike of the much larger artillery projectile and more quickly make the 
necessary adjustments in range to place effective fire on their target. 
Gibbon went on to point out that even if the rifleman did succeed in 
adjusting his sights to effectively engage a gun crew, it was a small 
matter for the artillerymen to increase or decrease the range by some 
maneuver of the gun, forcing the rifleman to again go through the 
laborious and time consuming process of getting his sights adjusted to 
the proper range. "These facts," Gibbon wrote, "to say nothing of the 
great physical, as well as moral effect of a rapid and well-directed 
fire of half a dozen guns upon a body of infantry, seem to demonstrate 
that the importance of artillery upon the field of battle is rather 
increased than diminished, and should rather urge to improvement in its 
range and efficiency, than to its abandonment and under-rating." To 
punctuate his argument, Gibbon went on to assert that the French were 
discarding entirely the use of long range sights on their rifled 
muskets, and reemphasizing the importance of the bayonet.41
41Ibid., 161-62. Gibbon did not directly name Wilcox or any other 
author in the text, but he so closely follows the structure of the 
argument concerning the superiority of rifled muskets over field pieces 
that Wilcox used in Rifles and Rifle Practice that it is obvious Gibbon 
is attempting to refute it.
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In his second reference to the rifled musket, however, Gibbon 
allowed that, despite the great importance of the role of the bayonet in 
the winning of battles, it was "now incontestible that the efficiency of 
a body of infantry resides essentially in its accuracy of fire." And he 
went on to say that a well directed fire from infantry armed with the 
new rifled musket was "sufficient to stop the advance of almost any kind 
of troops." But Gibbon refused to credit the infantry of the day with 
the ability to deliver such effective fire, stating that in battle even 
the best disciplined of them would waste their new found firepower by 
firing too much and at too great a range. The point that Gibbon was 
attempting to make did not concern the capability of infantry firepower 
in battle as much as it did the need for the establishment of a regular 
system of schools and training within the Army. He wrote, "To attain 
efficiency in the use of any arm, diligent and systematic practice is 
adsolutely necessary."42
In the particular case of the rifled musket, Gibbon advocated, as 
had Heth before him, a thorough system of target practice. Gibbon did 
not discuss the details of such a system in his book, possibly feeling 
that Heth had already adequately accomplished that, but he did point out 
that a system of target practice should include instruction in the 
theory of marksmanship, something that Heth had omitted. For Gibbon, 
this meant instruction in the physical science involved in the firing of 
the rifled musket, how gun powder acted upon a projectile, the 
implications of velocity, and a knowledge of trajectory, all of which he 
discussed at some length. Gibbon then concluded this section of his
42Ibid., 221.
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book with a short discussion of the system of rifle firing practice then 
in use in France.43
In the section of his manual dedicated to field artillery, Gibbon 
undertook to discuss the importance, use, and tactics of this arm in 
battle. Field artillery, he said, "has now become an indispensable arm 
in all armies; and brought to such perfection that no troops, however 
brave and well-disciplined, can do without it."44
Gibbon's concept of battle and of the use of artillery in battle 
was most conventional. In all cases, artillery was to be posted along 
the front of the main line of battle at a distance of at least 60 yards. 
In the defensive battle, the proper role of the artillery was the 
repulse of the enemy's columns of attack by throwing them into disorder 
through the well directed, converging fire of the field batteries. In 
the offensive battle, artillery was to be used to prepare the way for 
the main attack and to support the maneuver of the infantry and cavalry. 
While Gibbon counseled that artillery fire must always be delivered with 
calmness and intelligence, and at a proper range of 800 to 900 yards, he 
went so far as to assert that artillery was capable of going ahead of 
the main assault force to prepare the way for the grand charge, even to 
the point of advancing the guns to within 300 yards of the enemy main 
line to overwhelm it with grape and canister. He cautioned, however, 
that the cases when this tactic would prove to be successful "are very 
rare, and require much tact and resolution to know how to profit by 
them." In this discussion of field artillery in battle, Gibbon did not
43Ibid., 221-47.
44Ibid., 385.
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address infantry armed with the rifled musket, or for that matter even 
mention rifles except to again point out the advantage possessed by 
artillery because "the striking of the shot gives a means of correcting 
the fire, not possessed by small arms."4®
Even though Gibbon enthusiastically espoused the capabilities of 
artillery, he readily admitted that the moral effect of artillery fire 
was very often greater and more important than the physical. Toward 
this end, he instructed that solid shot was preferred against infantry 
in line of battle and was to be fired low to strike in front of and 
ricochet through the line so as to produce "a greater moral effect than 
one which passes directly through it." Shell and schrapnell were to be 
used as much as possible against infantry or cavalry in a column of 
attack because these rounds "produce a greater moral effect, generally, 
than grape or canister."4®
Gibbon's manual was a book written by an artilleryman for 
artillerymen. As such, it was not intended to be a comprehensive 
analysis of the capabilities of the rifled musket or a treatment as to 
how its firepower would effect the future conduct of battle. The points 
that Gibbon made concerning the new weapon and its use on the 
battlefield, though, differed markedly from those made by many of his 
contemporaries. Gibbon fully recognized the firepower potential of the 
rifled musket because of its long range and great accuracy, but denied 
that the full firepower potential of the weapon could be realized in the 
smoke and confusion of battle. In particular, the difficulties that
45Ibid., 386-87, 389, 402.
46Ibid., 404-5.
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Gibbon believed the infantryman would have during battle in estimating 
range and adjusting the rear sights of the rifled musket led him to 
conclude that the effectiveness of infantry would not be that much 
extended beyond its traditional effectiveness with the musket. While 
Gibbon conceded that infantry firepower might now be sufficient in the 
defensive battle, with the help of artillery, to stop the advance of the 
infantry assault columns, he wrote nothing to refute the belief that 
battles would be won by those same columns of assault with the bayonet 
as the principal weapon. If anything, infantry and cavalry required the 
firepower of the artillery more than ever before to help them break the 
enemy's infantry line at the point of the assault. To this end, Gibbon 
recommended no change in artillery tactics because of the introduction 
of the rifled musket. The ability of the artillery to maneuver and its 
overwhelming firepower, Gibbon believed, would be sufficient to maintain 
its role in the winning of battles.
At Charleston, South Carolina on 12 April 1861, the matter of how 
battles would be fought in the age of rifled small arms ceased to be a 
matter theoretical and academic and became one of terrible practicality. 
Yet, at that point in 1861, despite all the interest and effort that had 
been put forth by the nation's senior military leadership, its top 
military theorists, and its best young military minds, the superiority 
that the firepower of rifled infantry arms would possess over shock 
action in the coming battles was not recognized or understood. The 
warring factions of the nation, therefore, prepared for war in
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far behind the technology with which the war would be fought-
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CONCLUSION
The battles of 1861, 1862, and 1863 reflect very clearly the 
leadership and tactics of soldiers raised and trained to fight battles 
in which shock action was the key element of victory. Regiments of 
infantry were trained according to the tactics of Hardee or Scott, 
cavalry and artillery with the manuals of 1841 and 1855, and 1845 and 
1860 respectively. On the fields of battle, the armies of the North and 
the South were arrayed and maneuvered according to the precepts of 
Jomini, Halleck, and Mahan. This is not to say that the battles 
themselves were battles of shock action because they were not. It is 
evident in even the most elementary study of the battles of this period 
that firepower had become the dominant element of warfare. But officers 
educated in the doctrine of shock action could not at first see this.
By 1864, however, the terrible destructive power of the rifled 
musket was evident to every soldier in the field. On both sides, 
soldiers would not halt in the presence of their enemies without digging 
entrenchments to protect themselves from the fire of the rifled musket. 
Assaults on these field works were successful only with overwhelming 
superiority of force, and only if made over very short distances with 
minimum exposure to the rifle fire of the defenders. But even in these 
cases, the cost in terms of units and of life was extreme.
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Although dozens of manuals on both tactics and grand tactics were 
published during the war, little effort was made to correct the doctrine 
of 1861 in light of the reality of the battles. There was no staff and 
no system in either army dedicated to studying the battles and producing 
a revised doctrine which could be published for the benefit of the men 
who would fight the battles yet to come. Officers and soldiers in the 
field, as a matter of necessity, adapted the doctrine of 1861 based on 
their battlefield experience and communicated that experience directly 
to new units and replacements. The opportunity for doctrine, in its 
carefully thought-out written form, to predict and influence the manner 
of conducting battle had passed in 1861 and would not come again until 
after 1865.
The dominance of firepower on the Civil War battlefield in the 
form of the infantry's rifled musket and the inadequacy of the tactical 
and grand tactical doctrine with which the war was fought are facts that 
influenced the conduct and outcome of Civil War battles. That 
influence, however, has very often not been understood or considered by 
military critics and historians who have written about the battles and 
the military conduct of the war in general.
The participants themselves wrote extensively concerning their 
experiences in battle, and reviewed the campaigns and battles seeking to 
find reason for every defeat and victory. Many of these works are rich 
in tactical detail, providing today's historian with the material 
necessary for an in-depth analysis of the tactics used in battle. Rufus 
Dawes, for example, in his classic Service with the Sixth Wisconsin
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Volunteers describes the formations, commands, and movements he employed 
as a regimental commander from 1862 through 1864. But, while the 
participants often described the details of the tactics they used and 
commented on the extraordinary effects of rifled musket fire, they did 
not produce a work which dealt directly with the inadequacy of shock 
action tactics on battlefields dominated by firepower.
In the years immediately following the war, even military 
theorists who were developing new doctrine based on the experience of 
the war failed to recognize how fully firepower dominated the tactics of 
shock action on the modern battlefield. In his new system of infantry 
tactics, published in 1867 and revised in 1873, Brevet Major General 
Emory Upton, a young officer with a brilliant record of combat service 
during the war, could not disassociate his new tactical system from the 
tactical system of lines and columns that had existed prior to the war. 
Recognizing, though, the even greater potential for firepower that the 
infantry would possess with the new breech loading rifle, Upton 
introduced a single rank formation which could be used in conjunction 
with the standard double rank formation, revised the instructions for 
skirmishers so that their deployment would be easier and their role in 
battle emphasized, and eliminated the square as being no longer 
necessary because he believed infantrymen armed with the breech loader 
could adequately defend themselves against cavalry by firepower alone. 
Still he wrote, "The introduction of the breech-loader has changed none 
of the principles of grand tactics; . . . experience will prove that the 
safety of an army cannot be intrusted to men in open order with whom it 
is difficult to communicate; but that, to insure victory, a line or 
lines of battle must be ever be at hand to support or receive the
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attack."1 It should be noted that Upton's new system of infantry 
tactics was reviewed and approved by a board of officers which included 
no less personages than General U.S. Grant and Major General George G. 
Meade.
By 1894, however, the tactical and grand tactical lessons to be 
learned from an in-depth analysis of combat during the Civil War was 
begining to show in doctrinal literature. In Organizations and Tactics, 
a work written chiefly for military professionals, Major Arthur L. 
Wagner carefully studied the tactics used during the war and concluded 
that the use of battalion close columns in the assault had generally not 
been successful during the war and lead only to very high numbers of 
casualties. Wagner also noted the extensive use of hasty entrenchments 
during the later stages of the Civil War and described it as "the most 
marked tactical feature of the War of Secession." But, even though he 
recognized the supremacy of firepower and believed it to be a key 
element in the conduct of an infantry assault, Wagner also believed that 
the infantry must "be able to deliver a heavy shock at the end of the 
fire action." To that end, he recommended that the infantry assault be 
conducted in a formation that amounted to little more than a variation 
on the columns of assault advocated by the pre-war theorists.2
Historians of the Civil War, at least those who are interested in 
the purely military aspects of the war, have tended to concern
1Emory Upton, Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, Adapted to 
American Topgraphy and Improved Fire-Airms (D. Appleton and Company, 
1874; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1874), vii-viii.
^Authur L. Wagner, Organizations and Tactics, 2nd ed. (Kansas 
City, Missouri: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., 1897) 102, 115.
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themselves with producing campaign studies that illuminate the move 
countermove that is the wealth of military historical writing. In just 
the last decade, however, works such as Herman Hattaway’s and Archer 
Jones's How the North Won (1983) and Richard E. Beringer's, Herman 
Hattaway's, Archer Jones's, and William N. Still's Why the South Lost 
(1986) have analyzed the military operations of both the North and 
South, seeking to explain the reason for the triumph of one side over 
the other. In doing so, they adequately discuss the capabilities of the 
rifled musket and the role of infantry firepower in winning or losing 
Civil War battles. In Attack and Die (1982), Grady McWhiney and Perry 
D. Jamieson reviewed Civil War tactical doctrine and attempted to 
establish that the Southern penchant for assaults against positions held 
by Federal infantrymen armed with the rifled musket was the chief reason 
for the South losing the war.
But even in the campaign studies and analytical works cited above, 
each of which in their own way directly treat the role of strategy and 
tactics in the Civil War, historians have tended to view the tactics of 
Civil War battles from the perspective of knowledge gained from an 
analysis of those battles after the fact. While this approach is 
certainly adequate and accurate in explaining why battles were won or 
lost, the problem with it is perspective. As has been argued in this 
thesis, the Civil War soldier did not enter the conflict with any 
precise knowledge, indeed almost no knowledge at all concerning how the 
rifled musket would affect the conduct of battle. Yet many historians 
treat the knowledge of the effects of firepower in battle as a fact 
known to those soldiers at the time of the war. In How the North Won, 
the authors state, "we believe that the dominant culture in both Union
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and Confederate armies was a faith in the defense aided by field 
fortifications and a belief that the offensive must rely on the turning 
m ov e m e n t .T h e  reality of the war, however, was that this belief in 
field fortifications and turning movements resulted from experience 
gained during the war and not from tactical doctrine that existed prior 
to the war. Throughout the war, officers and soldiers continued to 
train according to the tactics of Scott and Hardee and to conduct 
battles according to the principles and rules of grand tactics as 
established by Jomini, Halleck, and Mahan. Their tempering of those 
rules and principles, the extensive use of field fortifications, came 
only after the reality of battle had shown them that some change was 
required.
Even in those cases where historians have considered that the 
tactical conduct of Civil War battles was subject to a process of 
development during the war, they do not fully treat the tactical and 
grand tactical doctrine that was the common base for that development. 
The authors of Attack and Die do an excellent job of describing tactical 
theory as it existed at the beginning of the war, but stop short of 
providing a full template for the conduct of battle as it was understood 
by the soldier of 1861.
A fully detailed and precise understanding of tactical and grand 
tactical doctrine as it existed in 1861 is not necessarily a requirement 
for an historian writing a campaign or battle history or a work on some 
other military aspect of the war. Even Douglas Southhall Freeman 
occasionally used the terms "musket" and "rifle" interchangably as if
^Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 21.
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they described exactly the same entity. Many other historians have 
described the details of campaigns and battles in terms that relay the 
picture of battle but which are not precise with regard to the military 
terminology of the day. And many successful campaign and battle studies 
have been written that rely on an analysis of movements and 
countermovements without considering the doctrine that might, in the 
mind of the commander, have dictated those movements.
Officers and soldiers, however, fight battles and conduct 
campaigns according to the doctrine that they were trained in prior to 
their entry into a conflict. An understanding of that tactical doctrine 
in the way that it was understood at the time, therefore, can add a 
measure of detail and exactness to an historical narrative and can help 
to explain, in some cases, why a commander may have acted as he did.
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